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abstract 
In Japan, newspapers enjoy a special exemption from antimonopoly prohibitions against 
resale price maintenance (suppliers’ stipulations that bar downstream firms from price 
discounting), but are each required to set uniform prices throughout Japan.  In fact, the 
newspapers have rarely changed their subscription prices in recent years, and the three 
leading national dailies, together accounting for about half the total industry circulation, and 
thirteen other papers accounting for another one eighth of industry circulation, all have set 
exactly the same price (3,925 yen per month for combined morning-and-evening editions, 
and 3,007 yen per month for morning-only).  The remaining local papers all set lower prices.  
The authorized resale price maintenance, and prohibition against prices that vary 
geographically, arguably have allowed collusive price increases, but by precisely how much 
it is difficult to judge. I here estimate that if the coordinated pricing of the leading national 
and local newspapers is inflating their prices by 340 yen per month (about a 10 percent 
increase in their prices), it entails economic waste of 86-billion yen ($1-billion) per year but is 
adding only around 5-billion yen per year to newspaper industry profit. The estimate is based 
on an econometric model of newspaper demand, estimated for 47 Japanese newspapers 
using March 2007 micro-data. The paper also estimates the demand and supply of 
newspaper advertising and a newspaper subscription price equation using 2007 
cross-section data. The subscription pricing equation reflects the interdependence of 
demand between morning-only subscriptions and morning-and-evening subscriptions 
offered by the same newspaper 
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Japanese Newspapers 
1.  Introduction. 
In Japan, newspapers enjoy a special exemption from antimonopoly prohibitions 
against resale price maintenance (suppliers’ stipulations that bar downstream firms from price 
discounting), but are each required to set uniform prices throughout Japan.  The three leading 
national dailies, and eleven of the regional and local dailies, seem to have exploited this 
antitrust exemption to maintain collusive subscription fees.  This has benefitted the other 
newspapers and may have promoted improvements in their content, but has wastefully diverted 
resources away from the newspaper business and towards other less valued activities.  
Econometric estimate of the effects of this poses many challenges which constitute the main 
burden of the present paper.  I can here really only make an educated guess as to how large 
is the effect on prices of the coordination by the leading newspapers, and I guess it is about 
ten percent.  I then calculate the effects on consumer surplus and newspaper profit of such a 
collusive price increase based on estimated demand for newspapers constructed from 
mixed-logit estimate of an indirect utility function using March 2007 micro-data.  Such 
collusion confers social waste in the neighborhood of 86-billion yen ($1-billion) per year, but 
only increases newspaper industry profit by 5-billion yen per year (about $40-million per 
year).  The waste is many times greater than the added profit.  
The main reason why collusive price-setting by Japan’s leading newspapers imposes 
economic waste vastly out of proportion to the added profit it confers is that the newspapers 
are horizontally differentiated.  The newspapers would each exhibit a degree of market power 
even without colluding, facing elasticities of demand here estimated to be less than two. The 
newspapers gain something by colluding but not much.  The relative inelasticity of demand 
for newspaper subscriptions reflects the daily habit of reading a particular paper.  In Japan, 
most residents can choose among the four national newspapers and at least one local or 
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regional newspaper.  Many of them strongly prefer the one they are in the habit of reading 
daily.  
A further influence on the effects of newspaper collusion is that newspapers sell 
advertising as well as subscriptions.  To put it another way, newspapers are platforms in 
two-sided markets.  I estimate the elasticity of demand for advertising in any Japanese 
newspaper as 1.3.  Because selling advertising is profitable and the demand for advertising is 
proportionate to newspaper circulation, the newspapers tend to set lower subscription prices 
than they would if not selling ads.  But this means that the loss in consumer surplus from 
raising the subscription price is relatively great because the price increase is applied to a large 
circulation.  On the other hand, the collusive price increase has little effect on the 
industry-wide demand for newspaper advertising because it mainly shifts demand from the 
newspapers that coordinate in setting higher prices toward the ones that do not, rather than 
causing demanders to not subscribe to any newspaper at all. 
The econometric analysis that is the main content of the present paper follows in a 
line of research on newspaper economics initiated by Rosse (1970) and extending to Van 
Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007), Cayseele and Vanormelingen (2009), Fan (2011), and 
others.  The main novelties of this paper are that it uses micro-data rather than only 
aggregate data to estimate demand, and it models the interdependence of demand between 
morning-only subscriptions and morning-and-evening subscriptions offered by the same 
newspaper. It is also the first contribution to this literature that focuses on the Japanese 
newspaper industry, which is among the largest in the world based on circulation and which 
is showing remarkable resilience in the face of increasing competition from digital media. 
The micro-data used here come from a March 2007 random-direct-dial telephone 
survey of 27,788 persons living throughout Japan conducted by Video Research, Ltd. (the 
2007 edition of its annual JREAD survey).  I use these data to estimate the common 
parameters of a mixed-logit indirect utility function relating respondents’ choices among 
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available daily newspaper subscriptions (including the choice of not subscribing to any 
newspaper), to their own individual characteristics such as age, income and education and to 
attributes of the newspapers available in the prefecture where each resides.  Attributes of the 
newspapers include subscription price, number of pages of content per month, and whether 
the subscription is morning-and-evening or morning-only.  Although the national 
newspapers are priced the same everywhere in Japan, they compete with different local and 
regional newspapers in each prefecture.  The variation in choice sets across prefectures is 
sufficient to identify the effects of subscription price and other newspaper attributes on 
respondents’ choices.  I find that price elasticities of demand for most newspapers lie 
between 1.2 and 2 and that elasticities of demand with respect to number of pages of content 
per month lie between 0.2 and 0.5.  Because many of the Japanese newspapers offer a 
choice between morning-and-evening subscriptions and morning-only, interpreting these 
estimates requires a model that can accommodate the effects of price of each type of 
subscription on the demand for the other type. In effect, the newspapers offering both kinds 
of subscription are multiproduct oligopolists. I show how profit-maximizing newspapers 
consider the cross-elasticity of demand between the different types of subscription when 
setting the prices.  I also estimate the demand and supply of newspaper advertising and a 
newspaper subscription price equation using 2007 cross-section data. 
Before describing the analysis and estimates on which these inferences are based, I 
shall first describe some relevant features of the Japanese newspaper industry and its pricing 
practices.  
 
2.  The Japanese Newspaper Industry. 
Japan has five national news dailies (Mainichi, Asahi, Yomiuri, Nikkei and Sankei), 
several bloc papers that are available in contiguous prefectures (Tokyo Shinbun, Chunichi 
Shimbun, Chugoku Shinbun, and Nishi Nippon Shinbun), and another 40 or 50 newspapers 
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that mainly serve a single prefecture.  The Nikkei, often compared with the Wall Street 
Journal, features business and financial news and is not a focus of my study here. The other 
four national dailies, Yomiuri, Mainichi, Asahi, and Sankei together account for about half the 
total circulation of all newspapers. The total circulation of news dailies (not including sports 
dailies, tabloids, or political newspapers) in Japan is about 85 percent of the number of 
households and more than 95 percent of sales are by monthly subscription rather than 
single-issue.  
Table 1 shows the 2007 household penetration rates in each prefecture for the 
newspapers that are the focus of this study.  It includes the four national dailies other than 
Nikkei and all of the other dailies with circulation of 100,000 or more.  Of the 47 
newspapers, all four of the national newspapers and nine local newspapers are available in at 
least some prefectures either as morning-only subscription or morning-and-evening 
subscription. Another eight newspapers are only available as morning-and-evening 
subscription. And the remaining 18 do not publish evening editions.  It is evident from the 
table that the local papers enjoy large shares in many of the less populous prefectures.  This is 
even more evident in the Figure 1 showing the cumulative circulation of newspapers in each 
prefecture of Japan moving from west to east. 
The newspaper publishers distribute through independent newsdealers.  The typical 
arrangement entails an exclusive geographic territory assigned by the newspaper company, 
daily purchase of a number of copies, the number being set by the newspaper company, and 
resale at a price stipulated by the newspaper –exclusive territory, stipulated resale price and a 
sales quota.  That the newspapers enforce sales quotas, which would violate antimonopoly 
proscriptions, is widely denied by the newspaper companies but is evidently a fact.  The 
newspapers that are shipped and billed to the distributors, and unwanted by them, are referred 
to as oshigami–literally “push papers”.  Documentation of this practice can be found in the 
Wikipedia entry for “shinbun hanbai ten” (newspaper sellers in Japan).  
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The Japanese newspapers, and other publishers, enjoy a special exemption from 
antimonopoly prohibitions against resale price maintenance (Antimonopoly, Section 23-2 (4)).  
The exemption dates from the 1953 amendments to the 1947 Antimonopoly Law.   
Newspaper publishers are also bound by a special directive of the Japan Fair Trade 
Commission enjoining against charging differing prices according to the area or person buying 
(most recently “Specific Unfair Trade Practices in the Newspaper Business”, Fair Trade 
Commission Notification, no. 9, July 21, 1999, amending the similar earlier notification no. 14, 
1964).  The directive also disallows discount pricing by newspaper distributors, and disallows 
the newspaper publishers from imposing minimum quantities (sales quotas) on distributors, 
though apparently as already stated the publishers do this anyway.  Under the special directive, 
each newspaper is free to set its own price but must then charge that same price wherever the 
newspaper is sold.  Different editions of the newspaper may command differing prices.  At 
least since 1945 and probably before that, the three leading national dailies Yomiuri, Asahi and 
Mainichi, have all set the same subscription price as one another and changed that price at 
roughly the same time as one another.  Price changes for all of the newspapers are infrequent.  
The last price change was in 2003, nine years ago.  Since then a monthly 
morning-and-evening subscription to any of the four national newspapers is 3,925 yen (around 
$40).  A morning-only subscription to the three other than Sankei is 3,007 yen per month.  
Not only the three leading national newspapers but also 13 local and bloc newspapers set 
exactly these same prices. The other newspapers set lower prices.  The Japan Newspaper 
Association has publicly supported the continuation of the special antitrust exemption allowing 
newspapers to maintain retail prices and indeed forestalled the adoption of a proposal in 2001 
to repeal it. 
Why resale price maintenance? A quick –and I think wrong– answer is that the retail 
price stipulation is actually a maximum retail price and is to prevent the independent 
distributors from exploiting the local monopolies that their exclusive territories confer.   By 
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raising the price to increase its own profit a distributor would actually diminish the total profit 
in the supply chain, the successive monopoly problem.  Those who are familiar with US 
antitrust law will recall the Albrecht case
1
 in which Herald Publishing Company, publisher of 
the St. Louis Globe Democrat, was found by the U. S. Supreme Court to have violated 
prohibitions against resale price maintenance in an apparent attempt to deter exactly this sort of 
overpricing.  The resale price maintenance of Japanese newspapers is different because the 
sales quotas that the newspapers impose on the distributors deter the distributors from raising 
prices.  The sales quotas are set at levels that not only deter overpricing but that also encourage 
solicitation of new subscriptions.  Because of this, the stipulated retail prices are binding 
downward; they are price floors, not price ceilings.  A simple explanation is that the resale 
price maintenance is part of a cartel scheme among the newspaper companies.   
Examples of resale price maintenance as a producer cartel scheme have been noted 
empirically and explored theoretically.  We have the Telser (1960) discussion of the light bulb 
case.  In the early twentieth century, duopolists Westinghouse and GE sold light bulbs through 
exclusive independent retail outlets and both stipulated the same minimum resale prices.  In 
Telser’s explanation, retail price discounting could be more easily detected and deterred than 
could wholesale price discounting, and exclusive dealing prevented retailers’ profiting from 
any secret wholesale price discounts that were not passed on as retail price discounts.  In Flath 
(1989) I suggested that a producer cartel scheme was the likely motive for resale price 
maintenance by the three producers of infant powdered milk in Japan, as documented in a 
series of antimonopoly cases, from the 1960s and 1970s.  Jullien and Rey (2007) develop an 
algebraic model in which resale price maintenance facilitates collusion among producers 
because it makes deviations from the collusive scheme easier for the colluders to detect and 
credibly deter, as explained by Telser.  This seems to me to be the essence of the Japanese 
newspaper cartel too. 
                                                     
1 Albrecht v., Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). 
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Another collusive practice of the Japanese newspaper industry is the newspaper 
holiday.  On one particular Monday each month, the newspapers all refrain from issuing a 
morning and evening edition.  The Japan Newspaper association defends this practice as 
needed to give the newspaper distributors vacation days.  This is absurd.  By rotating work 
shifts or deploying substitute workers newsdealers could permit vacations.  The newspaper 
holidays amount to a collusive restriction of industry output, for both distributors and 
publishers.  The fact that the newspaper holidays of the different papers are on the same days 
is evidence of collusion among the newspaper companies.  A rare instance of deviation is also 
revealing.  In February 2002, the Sankei Shimbun refrained from the practice of newspaper 
holiday.  The other papers publicly criticized Sankei but also themselves refrained from 
holidays.  Three months later the practice was reinstated, again with Sankei participating.  
That deviation by Sankei triggered deviations by the others strongly suggests that the 
newspaper holidays have the character of a prisoners’ dilemma, as is generally true of cartel 
schemes.   
My aim is to assess the actual increase in prices that can be attributed to collusive 
behavior by the leading Japanese newspapers, and determine also the likely effects of those 
price increases on profits, consumer surplus and newspaper content. 
 
3.  Demand for Newspaper Subscriptions 
I begin by describing random-parameter logit estimates of the demand for Japanese 
newspaper subscriptions. The data for this estimation come from the Japan Readers and Area 
Data (JREAD) survey conducted by Video Research Ltd.  This is a random-direct-dial 
telephone survey conducted in March each year that profiles newspaper readers and 
subscribers throughout Japan. The data are mostly used by advertisers.  I purchased temporary 
access to the 2007 survey with funds from a JSPS grant.  From the 2007 edition of the survey 
(with some considerable effort) I collected micro data for the 27,788 respondents including 
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which edition of which newspaper each subscribes to if any, age and education of the head of 
household, household annual income, prefecture of residence, and whether the respondent 
participates in local festivals and holiday events (a major focus of local community activity in 
Japan).  I used these data to estimate a utility function that relates the respondents` choices of 
newspapers to characteristics of the newspapers.  The data on newspaper characteristics 
mostly come from the Japan Audit Bureau of Circulation (JABC), augmented with data from 
Dentsu, Inc.  These include in which prefectures each edition of each newspaper was available, 
circulation, the subscription prices, number of pages of ads per month and number of pages of 
content per month.  Although the data are cross-sectional for the single year 2007 and the 
subscription price of each newspaper is geographically uniform, there does exist enough 
variation in the choice sets across prefectures (that is which newspapers in which editions are 
available for subscription), to estimate common parameters of an indirect utility function for 
newspapers.   
The basic econometric model is a multinomial logit model of utility with random 
coefficient on one variable, price of subscription.  The utility of newspaper subscription 
choice j by individual i is a linear function of (1) attributes of the choice, (2) interactions 
between choice-invariant characteristics of the individual and attributes of the choice, and (3) 
an unobservable error 𝜀𝑖𝑗 that varies randomly across individuals and alternatives according to 
the Gumbel distribution (Type I Extreme Value distribution).  Stipulate also that the utility 
function coefficient on price of subscription 𝑝𝑗 varies randomly across individuals according 
to the Normal distribution
2
. 
 
[1] 𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽
′𝑥𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼𝑖𝑝𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗      
𝛼𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝜎𝜐𝑖, where 𝜐𝑖 ~ 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙  [0, 1] 
                                                     
2 Stipulating that the coefficient on price is distributed normally does allow the possibility of 
positive price coefficient but in the actual estimates all 27,788 individual price coefficients are 
negative. I attempted estimates with price coefficient distributed lognormally but the estimates 
did not converge. On the merits and demerits of lognormal versus normal distribution of random 
parameters in mixed logit estimates see Hensher and Greene (2001). 
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𝜀𝑖𝑗 ~  𝐺𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑙  
 
The individual i chooses from among his choice set    the one alternative with the greatest 
utility value. The choice set includes any newspapers available for subscription in the place 
where the person lives and the choice of subscribing to no newspaper at all (j=0).  It will be 
the case that 𝑥𝑖 = 0 and 𝑝 = 0, so by construction, the mean utility value of not subscribing 
to any newspaper is zero: Ui0=0.  
From the observed choice set of each individual, observed attributes of each 
alternative, observed characteristics of each individual, and observed choice of each individual, 
I estimate the parameters of the utility function that are common to all individuals  𝛽, 𝛼, 𝜎  
using the method of simulated maximum likelihood (computed with the software NLOGIT).
3
   
 The variables that enter the utility function are made up as follows. 
Attributes of the newspaper subscription choices that do not vary across individuals: 
—Subscription price (units=yen per month) pj  
—Natural logarithm of number of pages of content per month (“news hole”)  
 
Interactions between choice-invariant characteristics of the individual and attributes of the 
choice (with units of measurement equal to underlined expressions where present, otherwise 
equal to zero or one): 
—Age head of household (one of four discrete intervals)  × 
1. Natural log of pages of content per month 
2. National newspaper × morning-and-evening subscription 
                                                     
3 The probability that individual  i  chooses  j  is 
 𝜋𝑖𝑗 = ∫
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽′𝑥𝑖𝑗+ 𝛼+𝜎𝜐𝑖 𝑝𝑗)
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽′𝑥𝑖𝑘+ 𝛼+𝜎𝜐𝑖 𝑝𝑗)𝑘∈𝐶𝑖
𝑓 𝜐𝑖 𝑑𝜐𝑖  , 
where 𝑓 𝜐𝑖  is the density function of 𝜐𝑖.  The simulated approximate probability that individual i chooses j  is 
 ?̃?𝑖𝑗 = 1/𝑆∑
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽′𝑥𝑖𝑗+(𝛼+𝜎𝜐𝑖 𝑠 )𝑝𝑗)
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽′𝑥𝑖𝑘+(𝛼+𝜎𝜐𝑖 𝑠 )𝑝𝑗)𝑘∈𝐶𝑖
𝑆
𝑠=1
 
where 𝜐𝑖 𝑠  is the randomly drawn value of 𝜐𝑖 on simulation s and S is the total number of simulations (which I 
set equal to 500).  The simulated log-likelihood function is 
ℒ̃ = ∑ ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛(?̃?𝑖𝑗)
𝐽
𝑗= 
𝑁
𝑖=1   
where  𝑑𝑖𝑗   =   {
1 if individual 𝑖 chooses alternative 𝑗
     0 otherwise                                                    
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 3. Local or Bloc newspaper × morning-and-evening subscription 
 
—Household annual income (one of sixteen discrete intervals ranging from zero to 30-million 
yen or more per year) if greater than zero × 
1. Natural log of pages of content per month 
2. National newspaper × morning-and-evening subscription 
 3. Local or Bloc newspaper × morning-and-evening subscription 
 
—Each national newspaper (Yomiuri, Asahi, Mainichi, Sankei) × 
1. Survey response: “Participates in local festivals and holiday events.” 
   2. Head of household highest education level is college or above 
 
—For each national and bloc paper, square of road distance (th. Km) from newspaper home 
base to each individual’s prefecture of residence (home base for national papers Yomiuri, 
Asahi and Mainichi: Tokyo, for Sankei: Osaka; and for bloc papers Chunichi: Aichi, Chugoku: 
Hiroshima, and Nishi Nippon: Fukuoka). 
 
Table 2 reports the utility function parameter estimates. Dividing the other 
coefficients by the estimated marginal disutility of subscription price converts them to 
monetary units (yen per month).  From the estimates several things are evident. First, the 
marginal value of a page of content becomes less as income rises. Second, the value of 
morning-and-evening subscription rather than morning-only, holding constant pages of content 
per month, is greater the greater the income, and is greater for national newspapers than for 
other newspapers.  Third, the more distant is the prefecture of residence from the newspaper 
home base the lower is its value. This effect is stronger for the bloc papers than for the national 
papers.  And among the national papers it is stronger for Sankei than for Asahi, Mainichi or 
Yomiuri.  Fourth, those who participate in local festivals and holiday events place a lower 
value on subscription to national papers; this effect is strongest for Sankei.  Fifth, college 
education inclines subscribers to more value Asahi and less value Sankei. 
Further interpretation of the estimates comes from simulations that expose the effects 
on demand for each edition of each newspaper of changes in subscription price or changes in 
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number of pages of content.  I computed arc elasticities and cross-elasticities of demand with 
respect to changes in prices and pages of content, by simulating the effects of five-percent 
increases in subscription prices of each edition of each newspaper and five-percent increases in 
numbers of pages of content in each edition of each newspaper. These estimates may be found 
in the Appendix tables A1 and A2.  It seems that the price-elasticity of demand of most 
newspapers lies between 1.2 and 2 and is a bit higher for the leading national papers than for 
the others. The elasticity of demand with respect to pages of content lies between 0.2 and 0.5.  
This matches some results of other estimates of demand for newspapers in the literature.   
     Van Cayseele and Vanormelingen (2009) estimate a pair of equations describing the 
demand for ads and demand for subscriptions in Belgian newspapers.  The demand for 
subscriptions is specified as nested logit, in which readers first choose between subscription to 
the local paper versus a national one, and then choose within the one category or the other.  
Demand for subscriptions depends on the characteristics of newspapers and of readers, and on 
the prices.  Van Cayseele and Vanormelingen find that the elasticity of demand for 
subscriptions ranges from 1.25 to 3.05. Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007) estimate a nested 
logit specification for reader demand and simple logit specification for advertising demand for 
Italys’ four national newspapers.  In their preferred specification the newspapers set ad rates 
noncooperatively but collude in setting cover prices.  Fan (2011) estimates a multiple discrete 
choice model of the demand for U.S. newspapers (a model in which demanders may subscribe 
to more than one paper), with endogenous choice by newspapers of their quality and their 
prices, including price of advertising.  She uses the estimated model to simulate the effects of 
mergers of local papers with overlapping markets.  
     Rosse (1970) estimates a set of equations approximately like the three pricing and content 
rules implied by profit-maximization, using data for local newspapers across the US.  Rosse 
allows for curvature of the cost function (which the simple model here does not exhibit), and 
also allows demand for subscriptions to depend directly on amount of ads.  He finds a price 
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elasticity of demand for subscriptions of 1.4, taking into account the effect of change in 
subscription price on amount of ads, as interpreted by Blair and Romano (1993).  Rosse was 
the first to notice that variation in demand across cities could be exploited as a kind of natural 
experiment in measuring the effect of shifting demand on the costs and pricing of local 
newspaper monopolists.  As far as I am aware this same principal has not yet been exploited in 
the study of Japan’s local newspapers. 
 
4.  Newspaper Pricing and Content. 
      The next task is to model the subscription prices and advertising prices set by 
profit-maximizing newspapers in a way that can be used to estimate parameters of the 
newspaper cost function and establish benchmarks for assessing the effects of coordinated 
pricing behavior by the leading Japanese newspapers.  I begin by laying out a simple algebraic 
framework for relating newspaper prices, circulation, advertising and content.  Much of this 
will be familiar to students of newspaper economics.  Similar models have been sketched in 
Rosse (1970), Blair and Romano (1993), Van Cayseele and Vanormelingen (2009), and 
elsewhere.  Here I adapt the framework for analysis of the Japanese newspaper industry. 
For my purpose, it is necessary to accommodate newspapers that offer their readers a 
choice between a morning-only subscription and a morning-and-evening subscription.
4
 Let s1 
denote the number of morning-only subscribers to the newspaper and s2 be the number of 
morning-and-evening subscribers. And denote by km and am the pages of content and ads in the 
morning edition, and by ke and ae the pages of content and ads in the evening edition. Here an 
ad is defined as a printed item supplied to all subscribers, the same as the subscription content. 
The only difference is that the ad is paid for by the advertiser but the other content is paid for by 
the subscribers.   
                                                     
4 Virtually none proffer evening-only subscriptions.  The Shizuoka Shinbun claims to offer a 
choice between evening-only subscription and morning-and-evening subscription but based on 
circulation data, hardly any of their subscribers opt for evening-only. 
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Let us suppose that the demand for ads depends on the price to place an ad per 
subscriber, 
𝑝𝑎𝑚
𝑠1+𝑠2
  if in the morning edition or 
𝑝𝑎𝑒
𝑠2
 if in the evening edition.  Let us also 
suppose that the readers regard the ads indifferently.  To keep matters simple, posit a 
constant-elasticity demand system facing the newspaper in which all elasticities have the 
appropriate signs and lie within the unit interval: 
Demand by morning-only subscribers:    
[2] 𝑠1 = 𝐴1 𝑝𝑠1
−ξ1  𝑝𝑠2
ξ12  𝑘𝑚
𝜃1𝑚  𝑘𝑚 +  𝑘𝑒 
𝜃1𝑒  
Demand by morning-and-evening subscribers: 
[3]  𝑠2 = 𝐴2 𝑝𝑠2
−ξ2 𝑝𝑠1
ξ21  𝑘𝑚
𝜃2𝑚  𝑘𝑚 +  𝑘𝑒 
𝜃2𝑒 
Demand for ads in morning edition: 
[4] 𝑎𝑚 = 𝐵𝑚 (
𝑝𝑎𝑚
𝑠1+𝑠2
)
−ξ𝑎
 
Demand for ads in evening edition 
[5] 𝑎𝑒 = 𝐵𝑒 (
𝑝𝑎𝑒
𝑠2
)
−ξ𝑎
  
Let the cost of newspaper production depend on number of ads and circulation and on 
amount of content.  These costs include first-copy costs and costs that depend on the number 
of subscriptions of each type: 
[6]        = 𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑚 + 𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑒⏞        
𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡−𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠
+ 𝑓
𝑘
𝑘𝑚 + 𝑓𝑘𝑘𝑒⏞      
𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡−𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠
+  
(𝑐 𝑚 + 𝑐̅ 𝑎𝑚 + 𝑘𝑚 )𝑠1
⏞              
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔−𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
+     (𝑐 𝑚 + 𝑐 𝑒 + 𝑐̅ 𝑎𝑚 + 𝑘𝑚 + 𝑎𝑒 + 𝑘𝑒 )𝑠2
⏞                          
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔−𝑎𝑛𝑑−𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
 
Here, 𝑐 𝑚  and 𝑐 𝑒  are the unit cost of distribution in morning and in evening net of 
advertisers’ payments to distributors for including inserts (substantial in Japan, almost as large 
as advertisers’ payments to newspapers for print ads).  𝑐̅ is the cost per page of actually 
printing the newspaper (where k and a are the numbers of pages of content and of ads), fk is the 
first-copy cost of producing a page of content and fa is the first-copy cost of producing a page of 
advertising.  Notice that because of the terms 𝑐̅𝑎𝑚 𝑠1 + 𝑠2  and 𝑐̅𝑎𝑒𝑠2 in the cost function, 
the costs are not separable into cost of subscription and cost of advertising.  This makes it 
problematic to speak separately of the profits from subscriptions and from advertising.  
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Most newspaper advertising in Japan is contracted through advertising agencies, of 
which Dentsu is the largest. The advertiser pays the ad agency the price set by the newspaper 
but the ad agency pays a lower price to the newspaper.  In the empirical estimates below I 
will take the publically posted advertising rates of the newspapers to be the prices actually 
paid by clients but consider the advertising prices received by the newspapers (which I do not 
observe) to be a set fraction   of these prices, the difference representing the advertising 
agency commission (The commission rate is 1 −   0 ).  
The newspaper chooses content, prices of ads, and prices of subscriptions to maximize 
total profit: 
[7]  a 𝑝 ,𝑝𝑎, 𝜋  =   𝑝𝑠1𝑠1 + 𝑝𝑠2𝑠2⏞        
𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒  𝑟𝑜𝑚
 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
+  𝑝𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚 +  𝑝𝑎𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒⏞             
𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒  𝑟𝑜𝑚
 𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔
−       
The necessary conditions for maximum profit reduce to the following pricing rules:  
Prices of ads: 
[8] 𝑝𝑎𝑚 = (𝑓𝑎 + 𝑐̅ 𝑠1 + 𝑠2 ) 
−1 (1 −
1
ξ𝑎
)
−1
  
[9] 𝑝𝑎𝑒 =  𝑓𝑎 + 𝑐̅𝑠2  
−1 (1 −
1
ξ𝑎
)
−1
  
 
Prices of subscriptions
5
 : 
[10] (1 −
1
𝜆1
) 𝑝𝑠1 = 𝑐 𝑚 + 𝑐̅ 𝑎𝑚 + 𝑘𝑚 −
 𝑝𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑚
 𝑠1+𝑠2 
  
                                                     
5 The subscription prices ps are set as though the newspaper were receiving a subsidy per subscriber equal 
to the marginal profit that arises indirectly from advertising with each copy sold (for given price of advertising pa):  
   𝑝𝑎𝑎 − 𝑓𝑎𝑎 − 𝑐̅𝑎𝑠 
 𝑎
 𝑎
 𝑠
+
   𝑝𝑎𝑎 − 𝑓𝑎𝑎 − 𝑐̅𝑎𝑠 
 𝑠
=   𝑝𝑎 − 𝑓𝑎 − 𝑐̅𝑠 
 𝑎
 𝑠
− 𝑐̅𝑎 
=   𝑝𝑎 − 𝑓𝑎 − 𝑐̅𝑠 
 𝑝𝑎 𝑎
𝑠
− 𝑐̅𝑎  
=
 𝑝𝑎𝑎
𝑠
− 𝑐̅𝑎  
This marginal profit equals the marginal revenue that arises indirectly from advertising (= paa/s), minus the 
added-cost-per-copy attributable to advertising (=𝑐̅𝑎). 
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[11]    (1 −
1
𝜆2
) 𝑝𝑠2 = 𝑐 𝑚 + 𝑐 𝑒 + 𝑐̅ 𝑎𝑚 + 𝑘𝑚 + 𝑎𝑒 + 𝑘𝑒 −
 𝑝𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑚
 𝑠1+𝑠2 
−
 𝑝𝑎𝑒𝑎𝑒
𝑠2
  
where 
[12] 
1
𝜆1
=
(1+(
𝑝 2 2
𝑝 1 1
)
ξ21
ξ2
)
(ξ1− 
ξ12ξ21
ξ2
)
=
1
 1
  if  ξ21 = 0 
and 
[13] 
1
𝜆2
=
(1+(
𝑝𝑠1𝑠1
𝑝𝑠2𝑠2
)
ξ12
ξ1
)
(ξ2− 
ξ12ξ21
ξ1
)
=
1
 2
  if  ξ12 = 0 . 
These expressions [12] and [13] capture cross-effects, as when the newspaper 
raises the price of morning-only subscriptions to increase the demand for 
morning-and-evening subscriptions.  Table 3 lists the estimates of 𝜆1, 𝜆2 and 
other related parameters based on the arc elasticities computed from simulations 
using the mixed-logit utility function estimate. The mean value across 
newspapers (in the penultimate row of the table) shows that 𝜆1 and 𝜆2 average 
1.4 and 1.3, slightly lower than 𝜉1  and 𝜉2  which average 1.6 and 1.8. This 
reflects the positive cross elasticity of demand between morning-only 
subscriptions and morning-and-evening subscriptions to the same newspaper (𝜉12 
and 𝜉21  which average 0.4). I would expect that newspapers would raise 
subscription prices slightly to exploit this cross effect based on Equations [10] and 
[11]. 
The profit-maximizing pages of content  𝑘𝑚 and 𝑘𝑒 fulfill the following:  
 
[14] 
( 𝑘+𝑐̅ 𝑠1+𝑠2 ) 𝑚
𝑝 1𝑠1
= (
𝜃1𝑚+(
 𝑘𝑚
 𝑘𝑚+ 𝑘𝑒
)𝜃1𝑒
𝜆1
) + (
𝜃2𝑚+(
 𝑘𝑚
 𝑘𝑚+ 𝑘𝑒
)𝜃2𝑒
𝜆2
)
𝑝 2𝑠2
𝑝 1𝑠1
  
 
[15] 
  𝑘+𝑐̅𝑠2    𝑚+  𝑒 
𝑝 2𝑠2
=
𝜃1𝑒
𝜆1
(
𝑝 1𝑠1
𝑝 2𝑠2
) +
𝜃2𝑒
𝜆2
  
 
These expressions (showing cost of content relative to subscription revenues) look 
complicated but have a close relation to the Dorfman-Steiner rule for advertising, most evident 
for the single-edition case: 
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[16] 
  𝑘+𝑐̅𝑠1  𝑚
𝑝 1𝑠1
=
𝜃1𝑚
  1
  
This expression resembles the Dorfman-Steiner condition describing optimal advertising 
expenditure. This is because, analytically, the model here is the same as the Dorfman-Steiner 
advertising model: Demand for subscriptions has constant elasticity  0  𝜃1𝑚  1   with 
respect to content, just as in the Dorfman-Steiner model demand for the product has constant 
elasticity with respect to quantity of ads. 
 The last columns of Table 3 show the arc elasticities of demand with respect to 
pages of content from the mixed-logit utility function estimate.  The last two 
columns show the imputed cost of content relative to subscription revenue based 
on Equations [14] and [15].  Multiplying these amounts (right-hand-sides of 
Equation [14] and [15]) by the subscription prices 𝑝𝑠1  and 𝑝𝑠2  leads to 
expressions for content cost per subscriber that, based on [14] and [15], can be 
regressed on the reciprocal of number of subscribers 
1
𝑠
 (≡
1
𝑠1
 or 
1
𝑠2
), and on pages 
of content properly weighted k (≡
 𝑚 𝑠1+𝑠2 
𝑠1
 or    𝑘𝑚 +  𝑘𝑒 ), to reveal estimates of 
cost parameters  𝑓   and 𝑐̅ .  The result of that OLS regression is the 
following: 
 
[17] 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟 =                      𝑓  ×  (
1
𝑠
)  +                                𝑐 ̅  ×   𝑘   
                       = 2.2 million yen × (
1
𝑠
) +  0.96 yen per page × 𝑘  
s.e.  (5.2)                   ( 0.05) 
R
2
=0.92  ,  n=62 
 
The first-copy costs are not precisely identified by this regression. Perhaps they vary greatly 
across newspapers.  The per-copy cost of actually printing a page of content 𝑐 ̅ is precisely 
estimated and seems to be just under one yen per page.  It is useful to compare this estimate 
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with the subscribers’ marginal valuations of content pages based on the utility function 
estimate.  Figure 2 shows these marginal valuations averaged across subscribers for each 
edition of each newspaper plotted against monthly pages of content, km if a morning 
subscription, km+ke if morning-and-evening. The marginal values decrease as pages increase 
which reflects the diminishing marginal valuation of each person and self-selection of 
newspapers with more content by those with higher marginal valuation (because of their 
higher income for instance).  The marginal value of content for the newspapers with most 
pages of content (large circulation morning-and-evening editions) are fairly close to one yen 
per page, actually a bit below that.  This is consistent with the “efficiency at the top” 
character of nonlinear pricing schemes as deduced in Mussa and Rosen (1978).  The 
profitable strategy is to supply the efficient quality of content to the higher valuing 
morning-and-evening subscribers but supply less than the efficient content to the 
morning-only subscribers to deter subscribers from switching from morning-and-evening to 
morning-only.  I explore this aspect of Japanese newspaper behavior in more detail in Flath 
(2012).  My point here is that the estimated marginal value of content to subscribers is 
consistent with per-copy cost of actually printing a page of content 𝑐 ̅ of just under one yen 
per page 
  
4.1. Price of advertising and demand for advertising 
     Within the basic framework, much of the variation in price of advertising across 
newspapers can be related to variation in number of subscribers. The price of ads (not per 
subscriber) varies linearly with number of subscribers. The equations [8] and [9] can be 
pooled into a single equation:  
[17] 𝑝𝑎 = 𝑓𝑎 
−1 (1 −
1
ξ𝑎
)
−1
+ 𝑐̅ −1 (1 −
1
ξ𝑎
)
−1
𝑠  
where 𝑝𝑎 = 𝑝𝑎𝑚 or  𝑝𝑎𝑒,  and 𝑠 = {
𝑠1 + 𝑠2 ,    𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑎 = 𝑝𝑎𝑚
𝑠2        ,    𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑎 = 𝑝𝑎𝑒
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Newspapers with greater circulation, all else the same, have higher ad prices: 
[18] 
𝑑𝑝𝑎
𝑑𝑠
= 𝑐̅ −1 (1 −
1
ξ𝑎
)
−1
 0 ,  
but lower ad prices per subscriber: 
[19] 
𝑑(
𝑝𝑎
 
)
𝑑𝑠
= −𝑓𝑎 
−1 (1 −
1
ξ𝑎
)
−1
𝑠−2  0    
It is possible that elasticity of demand for advertising varies from one newspaper to another.  
But it turns out that much of the actual variation in ad pricing across Japan’s local newspapers 
is linearly related to number of subscribers, as implied by the model just described and 
assuming that the elasticity of demand for advertising is the same for all newspapers.  
     Table 4 reports OLS regressions in which newspaper ad pricing is a linear function of 
circulation as in equation [17]:   
[20]  𝑝𝑎 =   +  1𝑠 +    
There are four different prices, so four separate regressions. The dependent variable in the 
left-most regression of the table is the price for a legal notice posted in the society page per 
centimeter width of a horizontal column (dan in Japanese).  This is the basic plain-vanilla ad 
rate that is the anchor for each newspaper’s menu of ad prices. The dependent variables in the 
other three Table 3 regressions are contract prices per horizontal column for black-and-white 
business display ads.  These vary depending on whether the contract is for one, five or fifteen 
horizontal columns, within a six-month period.  A page is divided into fifteen horizontal 
columns, so these are prices for one-fifteenth page, one-third page or one page, cumulatively 
within the contract period.  The rate for ads smaller than one horizontal column is the same as 
for a legal notice and is priced per horizontal column per centimeter width.  A (Yomiuri 
Shimbun) page is 37.9 cm wide.  A (perhaps typical) small ad might amount to one half 
column (in other words 1/30th of a page), and so its price would be 18.95 x the price per 
centimeter portion of a horizontal column for a legal notice.  The regressions use 2007 
circulation, but 2003 was the year in which the prices were last changed; they have remained 
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the same in the nine years since then.  The unit of observation is the particular edition of each 
paper.  Some of the observations are for ads placed in more than one regional edition of a 
national newspaper. For these I aggregated the circulation over the regional editions covered.  
With those observations excluded, Chow tests favored the pooling of national and local papers.  
Chow tests favored pooling of morning and evening editions even with those observations 
included.  The estimates reported in Table 4 are for the pooled sample.   The R-squared is 
0.89 for legal notice and 0.90 for the business display ads.  It seems that the basic framework 
adequately describes the newspaper advertising cost function and the ad pricing behavior of 
newspapers.  That is, the newspapers each face a similar elasticity of demand for advertising 
and have similar first-copy costs of supplying advertising.  The newspapers with greater 
circulation have correspondingly lower incremental costs and so set lower prices.   Picard 
(1998) notes an approximately similar pattern in the advertising rates of U.S. newspapers. 
 To estimate the demand for newspaper advertising requires instrumental variables for 
advertising price because of possible endogeneity.  In my way of thinking here, the newspaper 
circulation determines the incremental cost per page of ads, and so given constant elasticity of 
demand for advertising, circulation also determines the profit-maximizing price of advertising 
per page of ads. But the demand for ads depends on the price per page of ads per subscriber.  
The fundamental endogeneity in ad price per subscriber arises from the effects of subscription 
price on number of subscribers. Using instrumental variables for circulation resolves this 
endogeneity.  My instruments for circulation s are the number of households in the newspaper 
home prefecture if it is a local or bloc newspaper, a dummy variable if it is a national 
newspaper, and number of pages of content per month.  Because greater circulation lowers the 
incremental cost of pages of content, number of pages of content is a valid instrument for 
circulation (It is inversely correlated with circulation).  I estimate the following pair of 
equations with the generalized method of moments, using SAS software: 
 Equation 1—Advertising price per page of ads:   
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[21]  𝑝𝑎 =   +  1𝑠  
 
Equation 2—Demand for advertising:   
[22]  ln 𝑎 = 𝛽  + 𝜉𝑎 𝑙𝑛   /𝑠 +  1  +  𝛽1  ln  𝐴 𝑔 𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒  + 𝛽2  𝑐𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒  
 
Instruments for s: (1) pages of content per month, (2) newspaper home prefecture number of 
households if bloc newspaper or local newspaper, (3) dummy=1 if national newspaper and =0 
if not.  AvgIncome is average annual household income of subscribers to the newspaper and 
PcntCollege is the percent of the subscribers to the newspaper that have a college education. 
From the estimates which are in Table 5, the elasticity of demand for advertising 
appears to be about 1.3 with a standard error of 0.6.  This seems about right, close to the 
corresponding estimate for Belgian newspapers (=1.5) reported by Van Cayseele and 
Vanormelingen (2009), and the estimate for U.S newspapers (=1.6) by Rosse (1970). There 
are three pairs of regressions in Table 2. The dependent variables in the demand equations are 
the business display ad rates per page of ads divided by circulation, for 1-dan, 5-dan and 
15-dan contracts.  All three regressions are similar. 
From the Table 5 regressions we can glean some information about the first-copy 
cost of a page of advertising 𝑓𝑎, the cost per subscriber of actually printing and distributing a 
page of ads 𝑐̅, and the advertising agency commission rate 1 −  .  If elasticity of demand 
for advertising 𝜉𝑎  is around 1.3 as here estimated, then first-copy cost of a page of 
advertising is 
 𝑓𝑎 =   (1 −
1
ξ𝑎
)  1 2 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑎𝑔𝑒 × (1 −
1
1  
) = 0   𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑎𝑔𝑒  
and 
𝑐̅ −1 =  1 (1 −
1
ξ𝑎
)    𝑦𝑒𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟 × (1 −
1
1  
) =
                                                                                                          1   𝑦𝑒𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟   
From my earlier estimate that 𝑐̅ is just below one yen per page, this suggests that    0.7 
implying an ad agency commission rate of 30 percent.  A widely repeated claim in both 
21 
 
Japan and the US is that the standard ad agency commission rate for newspaper advertising is 
15 percent. Presuming the other parameter estimates are accurate, that might suggest that the 
elasticity of demand for advertising is around 1.2 rather than 1.3 which is of course plausible.  
I don’t really know. 
 I next turn to a major focus of my effort, the pricing of subscriptions. 
 
4.2.  Price of subscriptions. 
Under the Japan Fair Trade Commission special directive each newspaper is obliged 
to set geographically uniform prices but need not set the same price as rival newspapers.  
Nikae (2010) usefully points out that the legally mandated geographic uniformity can itself 
lead to softer price competition.  This is not part of my analysis.  My focus here is on the 
collusive setting of a common price. 
 My conjecture, which could be mistaken, is that the Japanese newspapers that all set 
the same common price per morning-and-evening subscription of 3,925 yen per month which 
is the highest price set by any in my sample, and morning-subscription price of 3,007 yen per 
month which is also the highest of any in my sample, are colluding. These newspapers 
include the three national newspapers Asahi, Mainichi, Yomiuri,
6
 and 11 local newspapers. 
That leaves 33 other newspapers setting lower prices.  The Shizuoka Shimbun is the largest 
circulation local newspaper with a subscription price below that of the national dailies.  Its 
morning-and-evening subscription price is 2,900 yen per month and its circulation tops 
700,000.  My strategy is to estimate an equation explaining the subscription prices of the 33 
low-pricing newspapers and use that equation to predict out-of-sample the subscription prices 
of the high-pricing newspapers. A comparison of the predicted prices with the actual prices 
measures the effect of the resale price maintenance collusion.  It is possible that even the 
                                                     
6 Though the morning-and-evening subscription price of the other national paper Sankei is 3,925 
yen per month, its morning-only subscription price is 2,950 yen per month,. 
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low-pricing newspapers are parties to collusion in which case this strategy would fail.  
Because my sample for this exercise is small I will take a step to broaden it slightly.  
The step is to make the unit of observation the particular edition of a newspaper, either the 
morning edition with subscription price 𝑝𝑠1 , evening edition with incremental price 
𝑝𝑠2 − 𝑝𝑠1, or morning-and-evening edition (for the eight newspapers in the sample only 
offered as morning-and-evening) with subscription price 𝑝𝑠2.   
The estimating equation is based on Equations [10] and [11] as follows. 
 
Morning edition: 
[23] (1 −
1
𝜆1
) 𝑝𝑠1 = 𝑐 𝑚 + 𝑐̅ 𝑎𝑚 + 𝑘𝑚 −
 𝑝𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑚
 𝑠1+𝑠2 
  
Evening edition, if morning-only subscriptions are also offered:  
[24]    (1 −
1
𝜆2
) 𝑝𝑠2 − (1 −
1
𝜆1
) 𝑝𝑠1 = 𝑐 𝑒 + 𝑐̅ 𝑎𝑒 + 𝑘𝑒 −
 𝑝𝑎𝑒𝑎𝑒
𝑠2
 
Morning-and-evening edition ,if morning-only subscriptions are not offered: 
[25]    (1 −
1
𝜆2
) 𝑝𝑠2 = 𝑐 𝑚 + 𝑐 𝑒 + 𝑐̅ 𝑎𝑚 + 𝑘𝑚 + 𝑎𝑒 + 𝑘𝑒 −
 𝑝𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑚
𝑠2
−
 𝑝𝑎𝑒𝑎𝑒
𝑠2
  
 
The dependent variable in the regression is the left-hand side of equation [23], [24] or [25], 
which one depending on whether the observation is for a morning edition, evening edition, or 
morning-and-evening edition of a newspaper that does not offer morning-only subscriptions. 
These variables are constructed from the subscription prices and from the estimates of λ1 and 
λ2 based on the arc elasticities computed from the mixed-logit estimate of utility. These 
dependent variables in the regression average around one fourth the amounts of the 
corresponding subscription prices. Some observations had to be dropped from the sample 
because of implausible values of elasticities.  There were 51 useable observations in the 
sample. 
     The explanatory variables are (1) advertising revenue per subscriber which is 
constructed by multiplying number of pages of ads per month times the posted price per 
subscriber (I used the 1-dan rate because it had fewer missing observations than the other ad 
rates), (2) dummy variables for morning-delivery or evening delivery, and (3) total number of 
pages per month including both content and ads.  I also include dummy variables equal to 
one if the newspaper is among those setting the highest prices (3,925 yen per month for 
morning-and evening subscription and 3,007 yen per month for morning-only subscriptions), 
to test for effects of coordinated pricing.   
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    The results of the OLS regression are reported in Table 6.  The coefficient on number 
of pages is 0.6 with standard error of 0.4, broadly consistent with the other evidence that 
printing costs 𝑐̅ for both ads and content lie just under one yen per page. The coefficient on 
advertising revenue per subscriber is negative as expected but small, equaling -0.09 with 
standard error 0.05.  If, as seems to be the case, the elasticity of demand for advertising is 
only slightly above one (say 1.2 or 1.3) and elasticity of demand for subscriptions is less than 
2, then ad revenue per subscriber is not very sensitive to changes in the subscription price and 
so it is unsurprising that ad revenue per subscriber would have little power in the regression 
explaining subscription prices.   
     From the other coefficients it seems that the cost of delivery is 475 yen per month per 
morning subscriber and 241 yen per month per evening subscriber. But the coefficient for 
evening delivery is imprecisely estimated.   
     Finally, the dummy variables for capturing the effects of coordinated pricing show that 
the newspapers that set 3,925 yen per month for morning-and-evening and 3,007 yen per 
month for morning-only subscriptions seem to be setting substantially higher 
morning-and-evening prices, but lower morning-only prices, than the other variables would 
predict. I hasten to add that the coefficient on the morning-edition coordinated pricing 
dummy is very imprecisely estimated and not nearly statistically significant.  The dependent 
variable in this regression tends to be about one fourth as great as the corresponding 
subscription price (p1 for morning edition and p2-p1 for evening edition).  That means the 
effect of coordinated pricing seems to be to raise the morning price little if at all but raise the 
morning-and-evening price by about 400 yen (≈4×(209—96)) from about 3,525 yen per 
month to 3,925 yen per month. In short, there is evidence here that the leading Japanese 
newspapers are indeed pricing collusively.  But it is very difficult to judge by exactly how 
much the subscription prices are affected by this collusion. 
      I next calculate the effects on consumer surplus and newspaper profits of an end to 
collusive pricing starting with an assumption about how subscription prices would change if 
the special exemption from antimonopoly prohibition against resale price maintenance were 
revoked and coordinated pricing ended.  For this calculation, let us suppose that the 
newspapers now setting morning-and-evening prices of 3,925 yen per month and morning 
prices of 3,007 yen per month were to lower these by 340 yen per month and 140 yen per 
month, to 3,585 yen per month and 2,867 yen per month.  Suppose also that the other 
newspapers keep prices unchanged.  From simulation using the mixed-logit utility estimate 
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of newspaper demand it turns out that these price reductions would confer an average 
increase in consumer surplus of 126 yen per month per household. This is the average 
difference in mean utility under the two scenarios divided by the utility of a one-yen price 
decrease (equal to the absolute value of the estimated coefficient on price), as in Small and 
Rosen (1981). Totaled over all households this would equal about 7.6 billion yen per month 
(91.2 billion yen per year, roughly $1-billion per year).  It would increase total subscriptions 
of all newspapers by about 0.7 percent, which would have little effect on the demand for 
newspaper ads. Much of the shift in subscriptions would be from morning-only to 
morning-and-evening subscriptions of the same newspaper, rather than switching between 
national and local papers. It would reduce revenue from subscriptions by 46.4 billion yen per 
year.  Further calculations imply that this would decrease newspaper profit by about 5.3 
billion yen per year (3.9 billion yen per year among the collusive newspapers and 1.4 billion 
yen per year among the non-collusive newspapers).  The net increase in social welfare 
would thus amount to 91.2-5.3=85.9 billion yen per year. The calculation for profit is based 
on the following and ignores any change in number of pages of content or ads. 
 From equations [8], [9], [10] and [11], the profit of each newspaper company is 
[26]     𝜋 =
𝑝 1𝑠1
𝜆1
+
𝑝 2𝑠2
𝜆2
− 𝑓𝑎 𝑎𝑚 + 𝑎𝑚𝑒 − 𝑓  𝑘𝑚 + 𝑘𝑒  . 
Collusive price-setting operates as though λi were adjusted downward slightly to λi′ say, 
below the level implied by equations [12] and [13], which raises the first two terms on the 
right-hand side of equation [26], increasing profit.  An end to collusive price setting reverses 
this, and lowers profit.  Using the estimated values of λ1 and λ2 and imputing the cartel 
pricing adjustment from 
[27]     𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 (1 −
1
λ′
) = 𝑝𝑛𝑜 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 (1 −
1
𝜆
) , 
the change in profit caused by reversion from collusive pricing to non-collusive is revenue 
divided by the corresponding adjustment factor, λi or λi′, differenced.  All of this assumes 
that no newspapers would go out of business and that total costs of production would be little 
affected.  
 
5. Conclusion.   
Japan’s leading national newspapers and eleven of the largest regional and local 
papers, protected by a special 1953 exemption from antimonopoly law, have persistently kept 
their monthly subscription prices at the same common level, which is higher than the 
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subscription prices of the other newspapers with whom they compete.  To assess the effects 
of this requires two things. The first is knowing how the prices would differ in the absence of 
coordinated pricing, abetted by the special exemption. That turns out to be very difficult.  
Despite my best efforts I am only able to venture an educated guess.  Based on comparison 
of the prices of the newspapers setting a higher price in common with one another with the 
prices of the others, and controlling for number of pages per month and advertising revenue 
per subscriber, it seems to me that the collusive price increase amounts to no more than 
around ten percent of the observed common price level of the high pricers.  A challenge for 
further study is to reach a more precise judgment about this, or even to overturn it. 
The other thing needed to assess the effects of collusive pricing by Japanese 
newspapers is an econometric model of the demand for each newspaper and of the relevant 
parameters of the cost of producing and distributing newspapers.  This is done here by 
constructing and estimating such a model using micro-data.  I estimate the parameters of an 
indirect utility function, based on the survey responses of 27,788 persons living throughout 
Japan in March 2007.  From the estimates of utility function parameters I infer arc 
elasticities and cross elasticities of demand with respect to subscription prices and pages of 
content.  Similar kinds of estimates but using aggregate data rather than micro-data have 
been used by others to assess the unilateral effects of mergers in the newspaper industries of 
the U.S. (Fan, 2011), and the Netherlands (Filistrucchi, Klein and Michielsen, 2012).  Here I 
perform an opposite kind of analysis by simulating the effects of a reduction in price 
coordination among newspapers rather than an increase in coordination.  I find that if an end 
to price coordination were to lower the prices of the affected newspapers by about ten percent, 
it would add 91.2 billion yen per year (about 1 billion dollars per year), to the consumer 
surplus of newspaper subscribers, but would decrease newspaper profit by only about 5.3 
billion yen per year (3.9 billion yen per year among the collusive newspapers and 1.4 billion 
yen per year among the non-collusive newspapers).
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Appendix 1.  Data sources: 
 
Pages of Ads, Total Pages: 
Dentsu Inc. (Annual a). Dentsuu koukoku nenkan (Dentsu advertising annual), Dentsu.  
Dentsu Inc. (Annual b). Dentsuu shinbun nenkan (Dentsu newspaper annual), Dentsu. 
 
Subscription Prices, Circulation: 
   Japan Audit Bureau of Circulation, shinbun hakkousha repooto (Report on newspaper 
publishers), Nihon ABC kyoukai, semi-annual. 2007, and 2007 July-December, Jan-June. 
 
Prices of Advertising: 
Koukoutantou.com. Website http://www.koukokutantou.com/newspaper_1.html 
 
Survey of Newspaper Readers 
Video Research Ltd., Japan Readers and Area Data (JREAD) Survey conducted in March 
2007. 
 
  
Table A1. 2007 Elasticity of Demand with Respect to Price (arc elasticities based on five percent increase in price of row newspaper)
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1 THE ASAHI SHIMBUN  morning -1.81 0.15 0.18 0.09 0.28 0.14 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01
2 THE ASAHI SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.24 -2.15 0.14 0.17 0.23 0.24 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.01
13 MAINICHI SHIMBUN morning 0.28 0.15 -1.88 0.10 0.28 0.14 0.11 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01
14 MAINICHI SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.23 0.27 0.17 -2.25 0.23 0.23 0.10 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.12 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.02
25 YOMIURI SHIMBUN morning 0.27 0.14 0.17 0.09 -1.81 0.14 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01
26 YOMIURI SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.23 0.25 0.14 0.16 0.23 -2.16 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03
49 SANKEI SHIMBUN morning 0.27 0.15 0.22 0.13 0.27 0.15 -1.89 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02
50 SANKEI SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.20 0.27 0.13 0.20 0.20 0.27 0.20 -2.27 0.00 0.00 0.00
54 HOKKAIDO SHIMBUN  morning 0.19 0.19 0.09 0.09 0.19 0.19 0.00 -1.52 0.66 0.00
55 HOKKAIDO SHIMBUN  morning + evening 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.19 0.00 0.58 -1.84 0.00
56 TOO NIPPO morning + evening 0.23 0.11 0.23 0.00 -1.26 0.46
58 DAILY TOHOKU 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.00 0.82 -1.48
59 THE IWATE NIPPO morning + evening 0.38 0.19 0.38 0.00 -1.14
61 THE KAHOKU SHIMPO morning 0.43 0.29 0.43 0.00 -1.59 0.58
62 THE KAHOKU SHIMPO morning + evening 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.00 0.47 -1.86
63 AKITA SAKIGAKE SHIMPO morning + evening 0.35 0.26 0.35 0.00 -1.04
65 YAMAGATA SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.36 0.27 0.44 0.09 -1.16
67 FUKUSHIMA MINPO 0.42 0.28 0.42 0.00 -1.40 0.56
68 FUKUSHIMA MINYU 0.27 0.14 0.27 0.00 0.55 -1.51
69 THE IBARAKI SHIMBUN 0.22 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.22 0.00 -1.78 0.22
70 SHIMOTSUKE SHIMBUN 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.45 0.00 -1.82 0.45
71 THE JOMO SHINBUN 0.21 0.21 0.00 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.00 -1.86 0.41
74 THE TOKYO SHIMBUN morning 0.25 0.27 0.16 0.18 0.25 0.27 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 -1.51 0.20 0.04
75 THE TOKYO SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.24 0.24 0.12 0.16 0.20 0.24 0.00 0.36 -1.94 0.04
76 KANAGAWA SHIMBUN 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.00 0.37 0.19 -1.85
77 NIIGATA NIPPO morning 0.45 0.30 0.45 0.00 -1.64 0.60
78 NIIGATA NIPPO morning + evening 0.32 0.16 0.32 0.00 0.48 -1.90
79 KITANIPPON SHIMBUN morning 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.41 0.00 -1.65
82 THE HOKKOKU SHIMBUN morning 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.62 0.54 0.54 0.54
81 THE HOKKOKU SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.29 -2.35 0.00 0.29
83 THE HOKURIKU CHUNICHI SHIMBUN morning 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.25 0.25 -1.77 0.25
84 THE HOKURIKU CHUNICHI SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.00 0.29 0.29 0.29 -2.29
85 FUKUI SHIMBUN 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 -1.51 0.57 0.19
86 THE NIKKAN KENMIN FUKUI 0.12 0.12 0.24 0.12 0.37 -1.10 0.12
87 YAMANASHI NICHINICHI SHIMBUN 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.42 0.42 0.00 -1.68
88 SHINANO MAINICHI SHIMBUN morning 0.33 0.17 0.33 0.00 -1.67 0.50 0.17
89 SHINANO MAINICHI SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.36 0.18 0.36 0.18 0.54 -1.80 0.18
90 GIFU SHIMBUN morning 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 -1.82 0.45 0.45 0.23
91 GIFU SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.35 -1.91 0.35 0.17
92 SHIZUOKA SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.27 0.27 0.14 0.14 0.27 0.27 0.14 -1.49 0.27 0.14
94 THE CHUNICHI SHIMBUN morning 0.24 0.24 0.12 0.12 0.28 0.04 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.04 -1.78 0.20 0.04 0.00
95 THE CHUNICHI SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.26 0.35 0.17 0.17 0.26 0.09 0.17 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.35 -2.18 0.00 0.00
97 KYOTO SHIMBUN morning 0.23 0.23 0.11 0.11 0.23 0.23 0.11 0.11 0.11 -1.82 0.23
98 KYOTO SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.19 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 -2.31
99 KOBE SHIMBUN morning 0.14 0.29 0.14 0.14 0.29 0.29 0.14 0.14
100 KOBE SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.24
102 NIHONKAI SHIMBUN 0.25 0.08 0.25 0.17
103 SANIN CHUO SHIMPO 0.28 0.09 0.28 0.09
104 THE SANYO SHIMBUN morning 0.44 0.22 0.44 0.22
105 THE SANYO SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.24 0.00 0.24 0.00
106 THE CHUGOKU SHIMBUN morning 0.24 0.08 0.16 0.00 0.24 0.08 0.16
107 THE CHUGOKU SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.17 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.17
108 TOKUSHIMA SHIMBUN morning 0.33 0.17 0.33 0.17
109 TOKUSHIMA SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.17 0.17 0.33 0.17
110 SHIKOKU SHIMBUN 0.32 0.21 0.32 0.21
111 EHIME SHIMBUN 0.30 0.20 0.30 0.20
112 KOCHI SHIMBUN morning 0.32 0.16 0.32 0.16
113 KOCHI SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
114 THE NISHINIPPON SHIMBUN morning 0.16 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.16 0.12 0.04
115 THE NISHINIPPON SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.13 0.00
116 SAGA SHIMBUN 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00
117 NAGASAKI SHIMBUN 0.17 0.08 0.17 0.00
118 KUMAMOTO NICHINICHI SHIMBUN morning 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.00
119 KUMAMOTO NICHINICHI SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.11 0.00 0.11 0.00
120 OITA GODO SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.00
122 MIYAZAKI NICHINICHI SHIMBUN (THE MIYANICHI) 0.14 0.14 0.21 0.00
123 MINAMINIPPON SHIMBUN morning 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.00
124 MINAMINIPPON SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.00
126 THE OKINAWA TIMES morning + evening 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
128 THE RYUKYU SHIMPO morning + evening 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NONE
fraction of switchers that choose NONE when price rises 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.00 0.13 0.11 0.27 0.11 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.31 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.00 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.27 0.17 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.10 -0.13 -0.09 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.13 0.08
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Table A1. Cont'd.  2007 Elasticity of Demand with Respect to Price (arc elasticities based on five percent increase in price of row new  
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1 THE ASAHI SHIMBUN  morning 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
2 THE ASAHI SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
13 MAINICHI SHIMBUN morning 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
14 MAINICHI SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
25 YOMIURI SHIMBUN morning 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
26 YOMIURI SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00
49 SANKEI SHIMBUN morning 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
50 SANKEI SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.00 0.00
54 HOKKAIDO SHIMBUN  morning 
55 HOKKAIDO SHIMBUN  morning + evening 
56 TOO NIPPO morning + evening
58 DAILY TOHOKU
59 THE IWATE NIPPO morning + evening
61 THE KAHOKU SHIMPO morning
62 THE KAHOKU SHIMPO morning + evening
63 AKITA SAKIGAKE SHIMPO morning + evening
65 YAMAGATA SHIMBUN morning + evening
67 FUKUSHIMA MINPO
68 FUKUSHIMA MINYU
69 THE IBARAKI SHIMBUN
70 SHIMOTSUKE SHIMBUN
71 THE JOMO SHINBUN
74 THE TOKYO SHIMBUN morning
75 THE TOKYO SHIMBUN morning + evening
76 KANAGAWA SHIMBUN
77 NIIGATA NIPPO morning
78 NIIGATA NIPPO morning + evening
79 KITANIPPON SHIMBUN morning
82 THE HOKKOKU SHIMBUN morning 
81 THE HOKKOKU SHIMBUN morning + evening
83 THE HOKURIKU CHUNICHI SHIMBUN morning
84 THE HOKURIKU CHUNICHI SHIMBUN morning + evening
85 FUKUI SHIMBUN
86 THE NIKKAN KENMIN FUKUI
87 YAMANASHI NICHINICHI SHIMBUN
88 SHINANO MAINICHI SHIMBUN morning
89 SHINANO MAINICHI SHIMBUN morning + evening
90 GIFU SHIMBUN morning
91 GIFU SHIMBUN morning + evening
92 SHIZUOKA SHIMBUN morning + evening
94 THE CHUNICHI SHIMBUN morning
95 THE CHUNICHI SHIMBUN morning + evening
97 KYOTO SHIMBUN morning
98 KYOTO SHIMBUN morning + evening
99 KOBE SHIMBUN morning -1.73 0.29
100 KOBE SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.24 -2.44
102 NIHONKAI SHIMBUN -0.68 0.00
103 SANIN CHUO SHIMPO -1.20
104 THE SANYO SHIMBUN morning -1.56 0.44
105 THE SANYO SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.24 -2.14
106 THE CHUGOKU SHIMBUN morning 0.00 -1.57 0.31
107 THE CHUGOKU SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.52 -1.91
108 TOKUSHIMA SHIMBUN morning -1.49 0.66
109 TOKUSHIMA SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.50 -1.83
110 SHIKOKU SHIMBUN -1.27
111 EHIME SHIMBUN -1.21
112 KOCHI SHIMBUN morning -1.43 0.79
113 KOCHI SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.61 -1.67
114 THE NISHINIPPON SHIMBUN morning -1.55 0.23 0.19 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.00
115 THE NISHINIPPON SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.64 -2.04
116 SAGA SHIMBUN 0.59 -1.29
117 NAGASAKI SHIMBUN 0.17 -1.00
118 KUMAMOTO NICHINICHI SHIMBUN morning 0.31 -1.56 0.94
119 KUMAMOTO NICHINICHI SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.22 0.56 -1.45
120 OITA GODO SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.10 -1.32
122 MIYAZAKI NICHINICHI SHIMBUN (THE MIYANICHI) 0.00 -0.70
123 MINAMINIPPON SHIMBUN morning -1.38 1.00
124 MINAMINIPPON SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.74 -1.38
126 THE OKINAWA TIMES morning + evening -1.22 0.91
128 THE RYUKYU SHIMPO morning + evening 0.92 -1.22
NONE
fraction of switchers that choose NONE when price rises 0.25 0.10 0.25 0.23 0.29 0.22 0.15 0.18 0.00 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.06 0.00 0.17 0.10 0.15 0.23 0.60 0.09 0.15 0.17 0.17
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Table A2. 2007 Elasticity of Demand with Respect to Pages of Content per Month  (Arc Elasticities Based on Five Percent Increase in Price of Row Newspaper)
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1 THE ASAHI SHIMBUN  morning 0.41 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00
2 THE ASAHI SHIMBUN morning + evening -0.06 0.42 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
13 MAINICHI SHIMBUN morning -0.07 -0.03 0.43 -0.02 -0.06 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
14 MAINICHI SHIMBUN morning + evening -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 0.46 -0.06 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
25 YOMIURI SHIMBUN morning -0.07 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 0.41 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
26 YOMIURI SHIMBUN morning + evening -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 0.43 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
49 SANKEI SHIMBUN morning -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 0.44 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
50 SANKEI SHIMBUN morning + evening -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 0.40 0.00 -0.07 -0.07
54 HOKKAIDO SHIMBUN  morning 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.28 -0.09 0.00
55 HOKKAIDO SHIMBUN  morning + evening 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.19 0.29 0.00
56 TOO NIPPO morning + evening 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.34 -0.11
58 DAILY TOHOKU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.16 0.33
59 THE IWATE NIPPO morning + evening -0.10 0.00 -0.10 0.00 0.29
61 THE KAHOKU SHIMPO morning 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.43 -0.14
62 THE KAHOKU SHIMPO morning + evening 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.16 0.31
63 AKITA SAKIGAKE SHIMPO morning + evening -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 0.00 0.26
65 YAMAGATA SHIMBUN morning + evening -0.09 0.00 -0.09 0.00 0.27
67 FUKUSHIMA MINPO -0.14 -0.14 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.00
68 FUKUSHIMA MINYU -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 0.00 -0.14 0.27
69 THE IBARAKI SHIMBUN -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 0.00 0.22 -0.22
70 SHIMOTSUKE SHIMBUN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.00
71 THE JOMO SHINBUN -0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.21 0.00 0.41 -0.21
74 THE TOKYO SHIMBUN morning -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.38 -0.04 -0.02
75 THE TOKYO SHIMBUN morning + evening -0.08 -0.08 -0.04 -0.04 -0.08 -0.08 -0.04 -0.12 0.40 -0.04
76 KANAGAWA SHIMBUN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.19 0.00 0.37
77 NIIGATA NIPPO morning 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.45 -0.15
78 NIIGATA NIPPO morning + evening -0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.16 0.32
79 KITANIPPON SHIMBUN morning -0.21 -0.21 -0.21 -0.21 -0.21 0.21
82 THE HOKKOKU SHIMBUN morning 0.00 -0.27 -0.27 -0.27 -0.27 0.55 -0.27 -0.27 -0.27
81 THE HOKKOKU SHIMBUN morning + evening -0.29 -0.29 -0.29 -0.29 0.00 -0.29 0.59 0.00 -0.29
83 THE HOKURIKU CHUNICHI SHIMBUN morning 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.25 -0.25 0.25 -0.25
84 THE HOKURIKU CHUNICHI SHIMBUN morning + even-0.28 0.00 0.00 -0.28 0.00 -0.28 0.00 0.00 0.56
85 FUKUI SHIMBUN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 -0.19 0.00
86 THE NIKKAN KENMIN FUKUI -0.12 0.00 -0.12 0.00 -0.12 0.24 -0.12
87 YAMANASHI NICHINICHI SHIMBUN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.42
88 SHINANO MAINICHI SHIMBUN morning -0.17 0.00 -0.17 0.00 0.33 -0.17 0.00
89 SHINANO MAINICHI SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.00
90 GIFU SHIMBUN morning 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00
91 GIFU SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.17 0.35 0.00 0.00
92 SHIZUOKA SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.00
94 THE CHUNICHI SHIMBUN morning -0.08 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.08 -0.04 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.40 -0.04 0.00 0.00
95 THE CHUNICHI SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.17 0.44 -0.09 0.00
97 KYOTO SHIMBUN morning -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 0.34 -0.11
98 KYOTO SHIMBUN morning + evening -0.19 -0.19 0.00 0.00 -0.19 -0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.19 0.38
99 KOBE SHIMBUN morning 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
100 KOBE SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.24 0.00 -0.24 0.00
102 NIHONKAI SHIMBUN -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08
103 SANIN CHUO SHIMPO -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09
104 THE SANYO SHIMBUN morning 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
105 THE SANYO SHIMBUN morning + evening -0.24 -0.24 -0.24 -0.24
106 THE CHUGOKU SHIMBUN morning -0.08 0.00 -0.08 0.00 -0.08 0.00 -0.08
107 THE CHUGOKU SHIMBUN morning + evening -0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
108 TOKUSHIMA SHIMBUN morning 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
109 TOKUSHIMA SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
110 SHIKOKU SHIMBUN -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11
111 EHIME SHIMBUN 0.00 0.00 -0.10 0.00
112 KOCHI SHIMBUN morning 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
113 KOCHI SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
114 THE NISHINIPPON SHIMBUN morning -0.04 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.00
115 THE NISHINIPPON SHIMBUN morning + evening -0.13 0.00 -0.13 -0.13 0.00 -0.13 0.13
116 SAGA SHIMBUN -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 0.00 -0.12 0.00 0.00
117 NAGASAKI SHIMBUN -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 0.00
118 KUMAMOTO NICHINICHI SHIMBUN morning 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
119 KUMAMOTO NICHINICHI SHIMBUN morning + evenin 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
120 OITA GODO SHIMBUN morning + evening -0.10 -0.10 0.00 0.00 -0.10 -0.10 0.00
122 MIYAZAKI NICHINICHI SHIMBUN (THE MIYANICHI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
123 MINAMINIPPON SHIMBUN morning 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
124 MINAMINIPPON SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
126 THE OKINAWA TIMES morning + evening 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
128 THE RYUKYU SHIMPO morning + evening 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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1 THE ASAHI SHIMBUN  morning 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 THE ASAHI SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01
13 MAINICHI SHIMBUN morning 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
14 MAINICHI SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
25 YOMIURI SHIMBUN morning 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
26 YOMIURI SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
49 SANKEI SHIMBUN morning 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
50 SANKEI SHIMBUN morning + evening -0.07 0.00
54 HOKKAIDO SHIMBUN  morning 
55 HOKKAIDO SHIMBUN  morning + evening 
56 TOO NIPPO morning + evening
58 DAILY TOHOKU
59 THE IWATE NIPPO morning + evening
61 THE KAHOKU SHIMPO morning
62 THE KAHOKU SHIMPO morning + evening
63 AKITA SAKIGAKE SHIMPO morning + evening
65 YAMAGATA SHIMBUN morning + evening
67 FUKUSHIMA MINPO
68 FUKUSHIMA MINYU
69 THE IBARAKI SHIMBUN
70 SHIMOTSUKE SHIMBUN
71 THE JOMO SHINBUN
74 THE TOKYO SHIMBUN morning
75 THE TOKYO SHIMBUN morning + evening
76 KANAGAWA SHIMBUN
77 NIIGATA NIPPO morning
78 NIIGATA NIPPO morning + evening
79 KITANIPPON SHIMBUN morning
82 THE HOKKOKU SHIMBUN morning
81 THE HOKKOKU SHIMBUN morning + evening
83 THE HOKURIKU CHUNICHI SHIMBUN morning
84 THE HOKURIKU CHUNICHI SHIMBUN morning + evening
85 FUKUI SHIMBUN
86 THE NIKKAN KENMIN FUKUI
87 YAMANASHI NICHINICHI SHIMBUN
88 SHINANO MAINICHI SHIMBUN morning
89 SHINANO MAINICHI SHIMBUN morning + evening
90 GIFU SHIMBUN morning
91 GIFU SHIMBUN morning + evening
92 SHIZUOKA SHIMBUN morning + evening
94 THE CHUNICHI SHIMBUN morning
95 THE CHUNICHI SHIMBUN morning + evening
97 KYOTO SHIMBUN morning
98 KYOTO SHIMBUN morning + evening
99 KOBE SHIMBUN morning 0.43 0.00
100 KOBE SHIMBUN morning + evening -0.24 0.49
102 NIHONKAI SHIMBUN 0.17 0.00
103 SANIN CHUO SHIMPO 0.28
104 THE SANYO SHIMBUN morning 0.44 0.00
105 THE SANYO SHIMBUN morning + evening 0.00 0.24
106 THE CHUGOKU SHIMBUN morning 0.00 0.31 -0.08
107 THE CHUGOKU SHIMBUN morning + evening -0.17 0.35
108 TOKUSHIMA SHIMBUN morning 0.33 0.00
109 TOKUSHIMA SHIMBUN morning + evening -0.17 0.33
110 SHIKOKU SHIMBUN 0.21
111 EHIME SHIMBUN 0.30
112 KOCHI SHIMBUN morning 0.32 0.00
113 KOCHI SHIMBUN morning + evening -0.15 0.30
114 THE NISHINIPPON SHIMBUN morning 0.35 -0.04 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
115 THE NISHINIPPON SHIMBUN morning + evening -0.25 0.38
116 SAGA SHIMBUN -0.24 0.24
117 NAGASAKI SHIMBUN 0.00 0.17
118 KUMAMOTO NICHINICHI SHIMBUN morning 0.00 0.31 -0.16
119 KUMAMOTO NICHINICHI SHIMBUN morning + evening -0.11 -0.11 0.22
120 OITA GODO SHIMBUN morning + evening -0.10 0.20
122 MIYAZAKI NICHINICHI SHIMBUN (THE MIYANICHI) 0.00 0.14
123 MINAMINIPPON SHIMBUN morning 0.38 -0.13
124 MINAMINIPPON SHIMBUN morning + evening -0.11 0.32
126 THE OKINAWA TIMES morning + evening 0.20 -0.20
128 THE RYUKYU SHIMPO morning + evening -0.20 0.20
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Table 1. 2007 Circulation and penetration rates, sample newspapers
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1 THE ASAHI SHIMBUN  morning 4,478,447 8.4% 0.3 3.5 10.2 9.9 6.3 10.9 7.2 11.0 3.2 11.3 15.0 4.9 25.3 11.1 10.9 9.9 8.0 16.3 8.4 7.9 3.4 7.3 17.4 14.1 5.7 7.4 5.9 7.7 9.5 4.7 3.0 2.8 8.5 10.5 6.4 12.7 14.4 12.7 11.3 18.7 10.2 17.1 9.2 10.1 7.7 4.5 3.9
2 THE ASAHI SHIMBUN morning + evening 3,588,260 6.8% 0.3 1.3 0.3 5.6 1.4 7.8 20.1 14.5 17.6 11.1 6.2 3.6 3.7 0.2 2.4 0.7 15.0 13.3 9.6 7.8 0.7 1.0 1.9 2.0
13 MAINICHI SHIMBUN morning 2,510,628 4.7% 0.1 1.4 6.2 6.8 2.8 8.4 7.3 11.7 1.5 5.4 6.2 1.4 22.5 2.9 4.0 5.9 4.6 13.9 13.3 4.1 2.4 5.0 12.0 7.7 2.4 2.7 2.5 2.3 3.5 1.4 0.6 0.5 3.3 3.3 3.5 6.6 8.3 7.6 6.7 12.3 6.1 6.8 3.4 1.8 3.0 1.7 2.1
14 MAINICHI SHIMBUN morning + evening 1,463,199 2.8% 0.1 0.5 3.9 1.1 4.7 14.1 6.5 13.1 4.3 2.1 1.5 1.1 1.7 0.7 0.3 2.3 3.2 1.8 1.9 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.6
25 YOMIURI SHIMBUN morning 6,163,453 11.6% 0.1 4.3 7.3 11.8 7.9 11.9 10.8 14.8 3.1 12.9 15.1 3.2 28.2 12.4 11.3 14.8 12.6 21.9 8.9 9.8 4.6 8.3 23.7 8.7 3.3 4.1 2.9 8.6 12.5 5.1 4.0 22.4 13.8 12.1 6.4 22.5 28.4 33.2 27.7 40.9 9.9 16.7 9.3 8.3 11.9 5.2 8.9
26 YOMIURI SHIMBUN morning + evening 3,868,988 7.3% 0.1 0.6 4.6 1.3 7.8 15.4 14.2 20.1 9.7 5.1 2.5 0.3 0.3 1.0 16.3 17.3 13.3 10.3 0.5 0.7 1.5 2.4
49 SANKEI SHIMBUN morning 1,567,455 3.0% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 1.5 2.8 0.6 0.0 1.6 1.8 1.1 1.3 12.3 13.4 3.4 7.1 1.8 4.3 1.5 0.1 1.7 0.1 0.9 1.9 0.8 0.3 0.2 1.4 3.2 6.0 5.2 3.7 4.3 6.1 6.9 1.1 0.9 0.8 1.2 0.9 0.6 0.0
50 SANKEI SHIMBUN morning + evening 633,154 1.2% 2.4 8.9 2.8 13.1 1.1 0.8
54 HOKKAIDO SHIMBUN  morning 564,517 1.1% 21.8
55 HOKKAIDO SHIMBUN  morning + evening 639,634 1.2% 24.3
56 TOO NIPPO morning + evening 255,976 0.5% 26.4
58 DAILY TOHOKU 107,369 0.2% 18.3
59 THE IWATE NIPPO morning + evening 231,437 0.4% 46.6
61 THE KAHOKU SHIMPO morning 391,485 0.7% 43.1
62 THE KAHOKU SHIMPO morning + evening 109,871 0.2% 12.1
63 AKITA SAKIGAKE SHIMPO morning + evening 260,884 0.5% 62.4
65 YAMAGATA SHIMBUN morning + evening 211,003 0.4% 53.5
67 FUKUSHIMA MINPO 303,626 0.6% 41.4
68 FUKUSHIMA MINYU 201,876 0.4% 27.3
69 THE IBARAKI SHIMBUN 123,136 0.2% 11.3
70 SHIMOTSUKE SHIMBUN 321,807 0.6% 43.8
71 THE JOMO SHINBUN 310,175 0.6% 41.7
74 THE TOKYO SHIMBUN morning 304,619 0.6% 1.1 1.2 2.4 2.2 2.9 0.9 3.1
75 THE TOKYO SHIMBUN morning + evening 280,889 0.5% 1.5 3.0 0.7 0.7
76 KANAGAWA SHIMBUN 218,041 0.4% 5.7
77 NIIGATA NIPPO morning 439,570 0.8% 53.2
78 NIIGATA NIPPO morning + evening 55,784 0.1% 6.5
79 KITANIPPON SHIMBUN morning 250,201 0.5% 65.7
81 THE HOKKOKU SHIMBUN morning + evening 258,466 0.5% 19.6
82 THE HOKKOKU SHIMBUN morning 84,808 0.2% 50.6
83 THE HOKURIKU CHUNICHI SHIMBUN morning 93,152 0.2% 19.0
84 THE HOKURIKU CHUNICHI SHIMBUN morning + evening 10,238 0.0% 2.3
85 FUKUI SHIMBUN 209,144 0.4% 78.2
86 THE NIKKAN KENMIN FUKUI 40,165 0.1% 15.1
87 YAMANASHI NICHINICHI SHIMBUN 208,133 0.4% 63.3
88 SHINANO MAINICHI SHIMBUN morning 432,739 0.8% 54.3
89 SHINANO MAINICHI SHIMBUN morning + evening 52,492 0.1% 6.5
90 GIFU SHIMBUN morning 146,283 0.3% 20.2
91 GIFU SHIMBUN morning + evening 31,070 0.1% 4.3
92 SHIZUOKA SHIMBUN morning + evening 717,229 1.4% 51.3
94 THE CHUNICHI SHIMBUN morning 2,124,288 4.0% 10.8 42.6 44.9 7.6 50.1 5.9 3.3
95 THE CHUNICHI SHIMBUN morning + evening 650,297 1.2% 6.0 18.2 2.5 6.7
97 KYOTO SHIMBUN morning 192,119 0.4% 12.2 12.6
98 KYOTO SHIMBUN morning + evening 317,881 0.6% 27.5 3.8
99 KOBE SHIMBUN morning 307,099 0.6% 24.7
100 KOBE SHIMBUN morning + evening 254,782 0.5% 11.2
102 NIHONKAI SHIMBUN 175,497 0.3% 75.7
103 SANIN CHUO SHIMPO 180,878 0.3% 62.4
104 THE SANYO SHIMBUN morning 394,612 0.7% 49.9
105 THE SANYO SHIMBUN morning + evening 72,015 0.1% 9.5
106 THE CHUGOKU SHIMBUN morning 644,166 1.2% 9.3 48.3 2.6
107 THE CHUGOKU SHIMBUN morning + evening 73,628 0.1% 5.7
108 TOKUSHIMA SHIMBUN morning 200,102 0.4% 63.1
109 TOKUSHIMA SHIMBUN morning + evening 54,622 0.1% 17.3
110 SHIKOKU SHIMBUN 208,307 0.4% 52.0
111 EHIME SHIMBUN 318,391 0.6% 51.6
112 KOCHI SHIMBUN morning 84,657 0.2% 24.2
113 KOCHI SHIMBUN morning + evening 143,219 0.3% 41.1
114 THE NISHINIPPON SHIMBUN morning 679,137 1.3% 0.9 3.7 3.5 13.8 20.6 22.7
115 THE NISHINIPPON SHIMBUN morning + evening 175,518 0.3% 8.2
116 SAGA SHIMBUN 141,023 0.3% 46.7
117 NAGASAKI SHIMBUN 190,034 0.4% 31.5
118 KUMAMOTO NICHINICHI SHIMBUN morning 274,491 0.5% 38.2
119 KUMAMOTO NICHINICHI SHIMBUN morning + evening 90,269 0.2% 12.3
120 OITA GODO SHIMBUN morning + evening 234,159 0.4% 46.6
122 MIYAZAKI NICHINICHI SHIMBUN (THE MIYANICHI) 232,578 0.4% 44.3
123 MINAMINIPPON SHIMBUN morning 362,219 0.7% 46.2
124 MINAMINIPPON SHIMBUN morning + evening 26,034 0.0% 3.3
126 THE OKINAWA TIMES morning + evening 206,569 0.4% 38.8
128 THE RYUKYU SHIMPO morning + evening 205,465 0.4% 37.9
Total   41,353,459
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All Japan number of households 53,101,635
Penetration Rate 77.9% 77.6 58.6 68.9 81.3 70.9 76.5 93.0 82.6 73.4 82.6 91.0 90.6 89.2 81.9 87.4 96.5 102.2 87.1 102.5 99.0 81.2 88.2 98.7 85.5 79.2 81.6 95.6 86.2 91.9 108.6 99.7 92.5 86.6 71.0 60.3 74.7 77.6 103.9 98.5 97.2 96.0 95.0 85.1 76.6 70.1 56.7 65.9
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Table 2. Random-parameter logit estimate of utility function 
 
Variable Parameter s.e. z 
Subscription price (yen per mo.) pj Mean of random coefficient   𝜶 -0.00073  0.00003  -23.8  
  s.d. in subscription price random 
coefficient                  𝝈 
 
0.00031  
 
0.00005  
 
7.0  
     
𝜷:  
   
ln pages of content per month  lnkj  -0.143  0.057  -2.5  
lnkj  × Household annual income =    
  less than 1 million yen -0.055  0.020  -2.8  
  1million yen up to 2 million yen -0.097  0.016  -5.9  
  2 million yen up to 3 million yen -0.050  0.015  -3.4  
  3 million yen up to 4 million yen -0.005  0.014  -0.4  
  4 million yen up to 5 million yen 0.028  0.014  1.9  
  5 million yen up to 6 million yen 0.039  0.015  2.6  
  6 million yen up to 7 million yen 0.075  0.016  4.7  
  7 million yen up to 8 million yen 0.096  0.017  5.5  
  8 million yen up to 9 million yen 0.080  0.019  4.2  
  9 million yen up to 10 million yen 0.084  0.019  4.3  
  10 million yen up to 12 million yen 0.129  0.021  6.1  
  12 million yen up to 15 million yen 0.153  0.027  5.7  
  15 million yen up to 20 million yen 0.135  0.031  4.3  
  20 million yen up to 30 million yen 0.113  0.053  2.1  
  30 million yen or more 0.191  0.087  2.2  
      
lnkj  × Age, head of household =    
  up to 24 yrs. 0.271  0.050  5.4  
  25 yrs to 44 yrs  0.400  0.056  7.2  
  45 yrs to 64 yrs 0.603  0.057  10.5  
  65 yrs or more 0.755  0.059  12.7  
      
Morning-and-Evening subscription 
to National newspaper 
 
× 
 
Household annual income = 
   
  less than 1 million yen 0.176  0.133  1.3  
  1million yen up to 2 million yen 0.233  0.105  2.2  
  2 million yen up to 3 million yen 0.309  0.073  4.2  
  3 million yen up to 4 million yen 0.394  0.063  6.3  
  4 million yen up to 5 million yen 0.287  0.062  4.6  
  5 million yen up to 6 million yen 0.290  0.063  4.6  
  6 million yen up to 7 million yen 0.359  0.063  5.7  
  7 million yen up to 8 million yen 0.516  0.067  7.8  
  8 million yen up to 9 million yen 0.495  0.077  6.5  
  9 million yen up to 10 million yen 0.625  0.073  8.6  
  10 million yen up to 12 million yen 0.656  0.069  9.5  
  12 million yen up to 15 million yen 0.771  0.080  9.7  
  15 million yen up to 20 million yen 0.844  0.102  8.3  
  20 million yen up to 30 million yen 0.969  0.176  5.5  
  30 million yen or more 1.089  0.217  5.0  
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Variable Parameter s.e. z 
 
Morning-and-Evening subscription 
to Local or Bloc newspaper 
 
× 
 
Household annual income = 
   
  less than 1 million yen -0.187  0.192  -1.0  
  1million yen up to 2 million yen 0.487  0.116  4.2  
  2 million yen up to 3 million yen 0.553  0.079  7.0  
  3 million yen up to 4 million yen 0.438  0.071  6.2  
  4 million yen up to 5 million yen 0.365  0.075  4.9  
  5 million yen up to 6 million yen 0.465  0.076  6.1  
  6 million yen up to 7 million yen 0.447  0.079  5.6  
  7 million yen up to 8 million yen 0.452  0.089  5.1  
  8 million yen up to 9 million yen 0.699  0.102  6.9  
  9 million yen up to 10 million yen 0.659  0.103  6.4  
  10 million yen up to 12 million yen 0.495  0.101  4.9  
  12 million yen up to 15 million yen 0.651  0.130  5.0  
  15 million yen up to 20 million yen 0.727  0.171  4.3  
  20 million yen up to 30 million yen 0.754  0.305  2.5  
  30 million yen or more 1.267  0.300  4.2  
      
Participates in local festivals and 
holiday events 
 
× 
 
Asahi 
 
-0.647  
 
0.030  
 
-21.4  
  Mainichi -1.266  0.040  -31.9  
  Yomiuri -0.339  0.029  -11.9  
  Sankei -1.808  0.066  -27.4  
      
Head of household highest education 
level is college or above 
 
× 
 
Asahi 
 
0.272  
 
0.036  
 
7.6  
  Mainichi -0.471  0.048  -9.9  
  Yomiuri -0.152  0.039  -3.9  
  Sankei -1.028  0.079  -13.0  
      
Asahi, Mainichi, Yomiuri × Th. Km from Tokyo, squared -0.010  0.000  -41.3  
Sankei × Th. Km from Osaka, squared -0.056  0.002  -26.8  
Chunichi × Th. Km from Aichi, squared -0.211  0.021  -10.1  
Chugoku × Th. Km from Hiroshima, squared -0.932  0.064  -14.6  
Nishi Nippon × Th. Km from Fukuoka, squared -0.664  0.043  -15.5  
 
 
n=27,778 
Chi squared [65 d.f.]= 132,971 
Log likelihood function= -51,966 
Restricted log likelihood= -118,451 
Inf.Cr.AIC=104062 AIC/N = 3.745 
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Table 3. Parameters of Newspaper Pricing and Content, (Based on Tbl. 2 Mixed-Logit Estimates of Utility) 
        
Elasticity and 
Cross-Elasticity w.r.t 
Subscription Price 
    
Elasticity and 
Cross-Elasticity w.r.t 
Pages of Content 
  
ID 
no. 
Newspaper 
m-e 
𝑝𝑠1, 
𝑝𝑠2 
𝑠1, 
𝑠2 
𝑘𝑚 𝑘𝑒  
𝑝𝑠2𝑠2
𝑝𝑠1𝑠1
 ξ1 ξ2 ξ12 ξ21 𝜆1 𝜆2 1 −
1
𝜆1
 1 −
1
𝜆2
 𝜃1𝑚 𝜃1𝑒  𝜃2𝑚 𝜃2𝑒  
(𝑓 + 𝑐̅ 𝑠1 + 𝑠2 )𝑘𝑚
𝑝𝑠1𝑠1
 
 𝑓 + 𝑐̅𝑠2   𝑘𝑚 +  𝑘𝑒 
𝑝𝑠2𝑠2
 
1 THE ASAHI SHIMBUN  morning 
 
3,007  4,478,447  595  
 
1.05  1.81  
 
0.15  
 
1.61  
 
0.38  
 
0.41  -0.03  
  
0.39  
 
2 THE ASAHI SHIMBUN morning + evening x 3,925  3,588,260  
 
200  1.05  
 
2.15  
 
0.24  
 
1.85  
 
0.46  
  
-0.06  0.42  
 
0.21  
13 MAINICHI SHIMBUN morning 
 
3,007  2,510,628  546  
 
0.76  1.88  
 
0.10  
 
1.77  
 
0.43  
 
0.43  -0.02  
  
0.36  
 
14 MAINICHI SHIMBUN morning + evening x 3,925  1,463,199  
 
184  0.76  
 
2.25  
 
0.17  
 
1.87  
 
0.46  
  
-0.04  0.46  
 
0.23  
25 YOMIURI SHIMBUN morning 
 
3,007  6,163,453  595  
 
0.82  1.81  
 
0.14  
 
1.65  
 
0.39  
 
0.41  -0.03  
  
0.34  
 
26 YOMIURI SHIMBUN morning + evening x 3,925  3,868,988  
 
351  0.82  
 
2.16  
 
0.23  
 
1.81  
 
0.45  
  
-0.05  0.43  
 
0.21  
49 SANKEI SHIMBUN morning 
 
2,950  1,567,455  576  
 
0.41  1.89  
 
0.07  
 
1.82  
 
0.45  
 
0.44  -0.02  
  
0.28  
 
50 SANKEI SHIMBUN morning + evening x 3,925  633,154  
 
227 0.41  
 
2.27  
 
0.20  
 
1.80  
 
0.44  
  
-0.07  0.40  
 
0.20  
54 HOKKAIDO SHIMBUN  morning  
 
3,007  564,517  608 
 
1.48  1.52  
 
0.66  
 
0.89  
   
0.28  -0.09  
  
0.25  
 
55 HOKKAIDO SHIMBUN  morning + evening  x 3,925  639,634  
 
254 1.48  
 
1.84  
 
0.58  
 
1.79  
 
0.44  
  
-0.19  0.29  
 
0.09  
56 TOO NIPPO morning + evening x 3,000  255,976  
 
161 
  
1.26  
   
1.26  
 
0.20  
   
0.34  
 
0.27  
58 DAILY TOHOKU 
 
2,600  107,369  460 
  
1.48  
   
1.48  
 
0.32  
 
0.33  
   
0.22  
 
59 THE IWATE NIPPO morning + evening x 3,007  231,437  
 
141 
  
1.14  
   
1.14  
 
0.13  
   
0.29  
 
0.25  
61 THE KAHOKU SHIMPO morning 
 
3,007  391,485  613 
 
0.37  1.59  
 
0.58  
 
1.33  
 
0.25  
 
0.43  -0.14  
  
0.27  
 
62 THE KAHOKU SHIMPO morning + evening x 3,925  109,871  
 
134 0.37  
 
1.86  
 
0.47  
 
1.14  
 
0.12  
  
-0.16  0.31  
 
-0.03  
63 AKITA SAKIGAKE SHIMPO morning + evening x 3,007  260,884  
 
123 
  
1.04  
   
1.04  
 
0.04  
   
0.26  
 
0.25  
65 YAMAGATA SHIMBUN morning + evening x 3,007  211,003  
 
144 
  
1.16  
   
1.16  
 
0.13  
   
0.27  
 
0.23  
67 FUKUSHIMA MINPO 
 
2,905  303,626  586 
  
1.40  
   
1.40  
 
0.29  
 
0.42  
   
0.30  
 
68 FUKUSHIMA MINYU 
 
2,905  201,876  606 
  
1.51  
   
1.51  
 
0.34  
 
0.27  
   
0.18  
 
69 THE IBARAKI SHIMBUN 
 
2,905  123,136  534 
  
1.78  
   
1.78  
 
0.44  
 
0.22  
   
0.13  
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70 SHIMOTSUKE SHIMBUN 
 
2,950  321,807  522 
  
1.82  
   
1.82  
 
0.45  
 
0.45  
   
0.25  
 
71 THE JOMO SHINBUN 
 
2,950  310,175  675 
  
1.86  
   
1.86  
 
0.46  
 
0.41  
   
0.22  
 
74 THE TOKYO SHIMBUN morning 
 
2,550  304,619  592 
 
1.18  1.51  
 
0.20  
 
1.21  
 
0.17  
 
0.38  -0.04  
  
0.42  
 
75 THE TOKYO SHIMBUN morning + evening x 3,250  280,889  
 
203 1.18  
 
1.94  
 
0.36  
 
1.58  
 
0.37  
  
-0.12  0.40  
 
0.22  
76 KANAGAWA SHIMBUN 
 
3,100  218,041  562 
  
1.85  
   
1.85  
 
0.46  
 
0.37  
   
0.20  
 
77 NIIGATA NIPPO morning 
 
3,007  439,570  600 
 
0.17  1.64  
 
0.60  
 
1.43  
 
0.30  
 
0.45  -0.15  
  
0.25  
 
78 NIIGATA NIPPO morning + evening x 3,925  55,784  
 
155 0.17  
 
1.90  
 
0.48  
 
0.73  
    
-0.16  0.32  
  
79 KITANIPPON SHIMBUN morning 
 
2,987  250,201  747 
  
1.65  
   
1.65  
 
0.39  
 
0.21  
   
0.13  
 
81 THE HOKKOKU SHIMBUN morning + evening x 3,925  84,808  
 
141 0.43  
 
2.35  
 
0.29  
 
1.35  
 
0.26  
  
-0.29  0.59  
  
82 THE HOKKOKU SHIMBUN morning 
 
3,007  258,466  728 
 
0.43  1.62  
 
0.54  
 
1.48  
 
0.32  
 
0.55  -0.27  
  
0.28  
 
83 THE HOKURIKU CHUNICHI morning 
 
2,905  93,152  715 
 
0.15  1.77  
 
0.25  
 
1.71  
 
0.41  
 
0.25  -0.25  
  
0.09  
 
84 THE HOKURIKU CHUNICHI morning + evening x 3,870  10,238  
 
166 0.15  
 
2.29  
 
0.29  
 
1.06  
 
0.06  
  
0.00  0.56  
  
85 FUKUI SHIMBUN 
 
2,650  209,144  600 
  
1.51  
   
1.51  
 
0.34  
 
0.38  
   
0.25  
 
86 THE NIKKAN KENMIN FUKUI 
 
2,100  40,165  628 
  
1.10  
   
1.10  
 
0.09  
 
0.24  
   
0.22  
 
87 YAMANASHI NICHINICHI SHIMBUN 
 
3,007  208,133  570 
  
1.68  
   
1.68  
 
0.41  
 
0.42  
   
0.25  
 
88 SHINANO MAINICHI morning 
 
3,007  432,739  722 
 
0.16  1.67  
 
0.50  
 
1.45  
 
0.31  
 
0.33  -0.17  
  
0.20  
 
89 SHINANO MAINICHI morning + evening x 3,925  52,492  
 
146 0.16  
 
1.80  
 
0.54  
 
0.76  
    
0.00  0.36  
 
  
90 GIFU SHIMBUN morning 
 
2,900  146,283  610 
 
0.25  1.82  
 
0.45  
 
1.66  
 
0.40  
 
0.45  0.00  
  
0.29  
 
91 GIFU SHIMBUN morning + evening x 3,370  31,070  
 
156 0.25  
 
1.91  
 
0.35  
 
1.14  
 
0.12  
  
-0.17  0.35  
 
0.27  
92 SHIZUOKA SHIMBUN morning + evening x 2,900  717,229  
 
154 
  
1.49  
   
1.49  
 
0.33  
   
0.41  
 
0.27  
94 THE CHUNICHI SHIMBUN morning 
 
3,000  2,124,288  612 
 
0.40  1.78  
 
0.20  
 
1.64  
 
0.39  
 
0.40  -0.04  
  
0.26  
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95 THE CHUNICHI SHIMBUN morning + evening x 3,925  650,297  
 
215 0.40  
 
2.18  
 
0.35  
 
1.58  
 
0.37  
  
-0.17  0.44  
 
0.22  
97 KYOTO SHIMBUN morning 
 
3,007  192,119  585 
 
2.16  1.82  
 
0.23  
 
1.52  
 
0.34  
 
0.34  -0.11  
  
0.28  
 
98 KYOTO SHIMBUN morning + evening x 3,925  317,881  
 
172 2.16  
 
2.31  
 
0.19  
 
1.99  
 
0.50  
  
-0.19  0.38  
 
0.16  
99 KOBE SHIMBUN morning 
 
3,007  307,099  587 
 
1.08  1.73  
 
0.29  
 
1.53  
 
0.35  
 
0.43  0.00  
  
0.36  
 
100 KOBE SHIMBUN morning + evening x 3,925  254,782  
 
185 1.08  
 
2.44  
 
0.24  
 
1.85  
 
0.46  
  
-0.24  0.49  
 
0.26  
102 NIHONKAI SHIMBUN  
 
1,995  175,497  597 
  
0.68  
   
0.68  
   
0.17  
   
0.25  
 
103 SANIN CHUO SHIMPO 
 
2,855  180,878  529 
  
1.20  
   
1.20  
 
0.17  
 
0.28  
   
0.23  
 
104 THE SANYO SHIMBUN morning 
 
3,007  394,612  661 
 
0.24  1.56  
 
0.44  
 
1.47  
 
0.32  
 
0.44  0.00  
  
0.35  
 
105 THE SANYO SHIMBUN morning + evening x 3,925  72,015  
 
136 0.24  
 
2.14  
 
0.24  
 
0.99  
    
0.00  0.24  
 
0.24  
106 THE CHUGOKU SHIMBUN morning 
 
3,007  644,166  624 
 
0.15  1.57  
 
0.31  
 
1.43  
 
0.30  
 
0.31  -0.08  
  
0.19  
 
107 THE CHUGOKU SHIMBUN morning + evening x 3,925  73,628  
 
162 0.15  
 
1.91  
 
0.52  
 
0.84  
    
-0.17  0.35  
 
0.05  
108 TOKUSHIMA SHIMBUN morning 
 
3,007  200,102  544 
 
0.36  1.49  
 
0.66  
 
1.19  
 
0.16  
 
0.33  0.00  
  
0.31  
 
109 TOKUSHIMA SHIMBUN morning + evening x 3,925  54,622  
 
185 0.36  
 
1.83  
 
0.50  
 
1.02  
 
0.02  
  
-0.17  0.33  
 
0.33  
110 SHIKOKU SHIMBUN 
 
3,007  208,307  601 
  
1.27  
   
1.27  
 
0.21  
 
0.21  
   
0.17  
 
111 EHIME SHIMBUN 
 
3,000  318,391  592 
  
1.21  
   
1.21  
 
0.17  
 
0.30  
   
0.25  
 
112 KOCHI SHIMBUN morning 
 
3,000  84,657  647 
 
2.13  1.43  
 
0.79  
 
0.64  
   
0.32  0.00  
  
0.59  
 
113 KOCHI SHIMBUN morning + evening x 3,770  143,219  
 
177 2.13  
 
1.67  
 
0.61  
 
1.87  
 
0.46  
  
-0.15  0.30  
 
0.16  
114 THE NISHINIPPON morning 
 
3,007  679,137  563 
 
0.34  1.55  
 
0.23  
 
1.34  
 
0.25  
 
0.35  -0.04  
  
0.25  
 
115 THE NISHINIPPON morning + evening x 3,925  175,518  
 
182 0.34  
 
2.04  
 
0.64  
 
1.28  
 
0.22  
  
-0.25  0.38  
 
0.21  
116 SAGA SHIMBUN 
 
2,905  141,023  605 
  
1.29  
   
1.29  
 
0.23  
 
0.24  
   
0.18  
 
117 NAGASAKI SHIMBUN 
 
3,000  190,034  577 
  
1.00  
   
1.00  
 
0.00  
 
0.17  
   
0.17  
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118 KUMAMOTO NICHINICHI morning 
 
3,007  274,491  621 
 
0.37  1.56  
 
0.94  
 
1.05  
 
0.05  
 
0.31  -0.16  
  
0.21  
 
119 KUMAMOTO NICHINICHI morning + evening x 3,364  90,269  
 
167 0.37  
 
1.45  
 
0.56  
 
0.93  
    
-0.11  0.22  
  
120 OITA GODO SHIMBUN morning + evening x 3,466  234,159  
 
205 
  
1.32  
   
1.32  
 
0.24  
   
0.20  
 
0.15  
122 MIYAZAKI NICHINICHI  
 
2,905  232,578  654 
          
0.14  
     
123 MINAMINIPPON SHIMBUN morning 
 
3,007  362,219  591 
 
0.09  1.38  
 
1.00  
 
0.80  
   
0.38  -0.13  
  
0.39  
 
124 MINAMINIPPON SHIMBUN morning + evening x 3,567  26,034  
 
154 0.09  
 
1.38  
 
0.74  
 
0.25  
    
-0.11  0.32  
  
126 THE OKINAWA TIMES morning + evening x 3,160  206,569  
 
137 
  
1.22  
   
1.22  
 
0.18  
   
0.20  
 
0.17  
128 THE RYUKYU SHIMPO morning + evening x 3,160  205,465  
 
134 
  
1.22  
   
1.22  
 
0.18  
   
0.20  
 
0.17  
 
 
                    
 
 
                    
 
MEAN 
  
590,764  604  175  0.66  1.56  1.80  0.43  0.40  1.41  1.31  0.31  0.28  0.34  -0.08  -0.13  0.35  0.26  0.11  
 
S.D. 
  
1,094,598  58  45  0.61  0.27  0.43  0.27  0.17  0.32  0.42  0.12  0.16  0.10  0.08  0.08  0.10  0.09  0.22  
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Table 4. Regression estimates relating newspaper ad pricing to circulation. 
 
OLS estimates of 
[22]  𝑝𝑎 = 𝑓𝑎 
−1 (1 −
1
ξ𝑎
)
−1
+ 𝑐̅ −1 (1 −
1
ξ𝑎
)
−1
𝑠 +     
where 𝑝𝑎 = 𝑝𝑎𝑚 or  𝑝𝑎𝑒,  and 𝑠 = {
𝑠1 + 𝑠2 ,    𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑎 = 𝑝𝑎𝑚
𝑠2        ,    𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑎 = 𝑝𝑎𝑒
 
  
 
 
Ad rate 
for legal  
notice 
(per cm) 
Advertising rate for display ad per page of 
ads (=15 dan) 
  
1-dan rate 5-dan rate 15-dan rate 
     
Intercept 8,184,111 2,455,071 2,205,316 1,944,448 
s.e. 669,478 387,169 367,110 330,189 
     
Number of subscribers 10.35  6.26  5.96  5.37  
s.e 0.38  0.22  0.21  0.19  
     
R-Square 0.89  0.90  0.90  0.90  
     
n=96 
    
     
 
   
Note. The sample includes observations for each edition of each newspaper: morning and 
evening editions, national and local papers.  
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Table 5.  GMM estimate of two-equation system, based on 1-dan, 5-dan and 15-dan rate for display ad. 
Equation 1—Advertising price per page of ads:  𝑝𝑎 =   +  1𝑠  
Equation 2—Demand for advertising:   ln 𝑎 = 𝛽  + 𝜉𝑎 𝑙𝑛   /𝑠 +  1  +  𝛽1  ln  𝐴 𝑔 𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒  + 𝛽2  𝑐𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒  
Instruments for s: (1) pages of content per month, (2) newspaper home prefecture number of households if bloc newspaper or local 
newspaper, (3) dummy=1 if national newspaper, and =0 if not. 
Variable Parameter 1-dan rate 
 
5-dan rate 
 
15-dan rate 
   
pa ln a 
 
pa ln a 
 
pa ln a 
           
 
Intercept    1,464,644 
  
1,232,950 
  
1,030,722 
 
  
s.e 171,192 
  
160,970 
  
143,329 
 
           s Number of subscribers  1 6.46  
  
6.23  
  
5.67  
 
  
s.e 0.39  
  
0.38  
  
0.35  
 
           
 
Intercept 𝛽  
 
28.01  
  
29.08  
  
33.75  
  
s.e 
 
28.50  
  
26.07  
  
25.24  
           
 𝑙𝑛   /𝑠 +  1  
Nat. log of advertising rate for display 
ad per page of ads per subscriber as 
predicted by ad price equation 
 
 
𝜉𝑎 
 
 
 
-1.30  
  
 
 
-1.27  
  
 
 
-1.27  
  
s.e 
 
0.54  
  
0.53  
  
0.55  
           
 ln  𝐴 𝑔 𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 
Nat. log of subscriber average 
household income 
 
𝛽1  
 
-2.81    
 
-3.02    
 
-3.80  
  
s.e 
 
4.79  
  
4.39  
  
4.25  
           
 𝑐𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒 
Percent of subscribers college 
educated 
 
𝛽2  
 
-5.06    
 
-4.71    
 
-3.75  
  
s.e 
 
5.89  
  
5.50  
  
5.35  
           
 
Number of observations 
 
63 
  
60 
  
60 
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Table 6. OLS regression estimate of subscription price equation. 
 
Estimating equation: 
Morning edition: 
[23] (1 −
1
𝜆1
) 𝑝𝑠1 = 𝑐 𝑚 + 𝑐̅ 𝑎𝑚 + 𝑘𝑚 −
 𝑝𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑚
 𝑠1+𝑠2 
  
Morning-and-evening edition ,if morning-only subscriptions are not offered: 
[24]    (1 −
1
𝜆2
) 𝑝𝑠2 = 𝑐 𝑚 + 𝑐 𝑒 + 𝑐̅ 𝑎𝑚 + 𝑘𝑚 + 𝑎𝑒 + 𝑘𝑒 −
 𝑝𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑚
𝑠2
−
 𝑝𝑎𝑒𝑎𝑒
𝑠2
  
Evening edition, if morning-only subscriptions are also offered:  
[25]    (1 −
1
𝜆2
) 𝑝𝑠2 − (1 −
1
𝜆1
) 𝑝𝑠1 = 𝑐 𝑒 + 𝑐̅ 𝑎𝑒 + 𝑘𝑒 −
 𝑝𝑎𝑒𝑎𝑒
𝑠2
  
Parameters to be estimated: 𝑐 𝑚, 𝑐 𝑒, 𝑐̅,  /𝑠 
 
Dependent variable = Left-hand side of [23], [24], or [25]. 
 Dummy=1 if 
newspaper for which 
p1=3007 yen per mo. 
and p2=3925 yen per 
mo. 
 
 
Morning 
delivery 
 
 
 
𝑐 𝑚 
 
 
Evening 
delivery 
 
 
 
𝑐 𝑒 
 
 
Pages 
per 
month 
 
 
(k+a) 
 
Advertising 
revenue per 
subscriber 
 
 
 
𝑝𝑎𝑎
𝑠
 
 
Morning 
edition 
 
Evening 
edition 
Coefficient 
estimate 
-96  209  475  241  0.62  -0.09  
s.e. 121  131  186  223  0.42  0.04  
              
F 0.62 2.54 6.49 1.17     
Pr>F 0.43  0.12  0.01  0.29      
              
R-Square 0.90            
n 51      
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Figure 1.  Morning circulation in 2007 of Japan’s national, local and regional newspapers in each prefecture, ranging from west (Okinawa) to east 
(Hokkaido). 
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3,500,000
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Local and Regional papers Sankei Mainichi
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Source: Chou-Mai-Yomi-Kei VS chihoushi no shea arasoi, dokusen nyuushu, tadoufuken ichiran (Asahi Mainchi Yomiuri Nikkei vs regional 
newspapers, rivalry for shares and monopolization, summary of number of copies issued in each prefecture), Facta, July 2007. 
http://facta.co.jp/article/200707008.html 
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Figure 2.  Marginal value of pages of content per month, based on mixed-logit estimate of 
utility function. 
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